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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENT
CHOICE:  THE CHALLENGE OF
COMPETING GOALS
ROBERT M. FRIEDMAN,* DONNA DOWNING,**
ELIZABETH M. GUNN***
I.  INTRODUCTION
The search for “smarter” ways to prevent and control pollution
has generated heated debate on almost every topic related to setting
goals, improving institutional arrangements, and choosing the most
effective means for achieving those goals.  Given the need to balance
other competing concerns, choosing the means or policy instruments
to meet environmental goals can be a surprisingly complex task for
decision-makers.  Unfortunately, today’s environmental policy tool-
box contains numerous and varied instruments yet lacks a clear set of
instructions for their use.
Richards’ article, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument
Choice,1 proposes a new theoretical framework for choosing such in-
struments.  He develops a taxonomy that provides the user with a list
of characteristics for each policy tool,2 and he suggests a normative
criterion for evaluating the instruments applied to a specific problem:
minimize public and private costs in light of legal and political con-
straints.3
In contrast to Richards’ efforts, we adopted the perspective that
each decision-maker or stakeholder may prefer a different instrument
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1. Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221 (2000).
2. See id. at 230-54.
3. See id. at 226-30.
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choice depending on his or her values.  In fact, our experiences tell us
that within the complex political process of choosing environmental
instruments, it is unrealistic (even dangerous) to assume that all will
subscribe to one, single criterion.  Thus, we propose a list of more di-
verse evaluation criteria and suggest that each instrument should be
evaluated in light of the fact that each criterion will be important to
some, but not necessarily all, decision-makers.  We also present a
framework within which a decision-maker can consider the charac-
teristics of a particular problem, along with his or her values, and
choose one—or, more likely, more than one—instrument to help
solve a problem.  Our framework also presents a way for those who
seek to promote a particular instrument for political or ideological
purposes to scope out the advantages and disadvantages of their
choice, given other stakeholders’ preferences.
In this Comment, we draw from one of the analytical efforts cited
by Richards, our 1995 Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Re-
port, Environmental Policy Tools: A User’s Guide.4  This OTA Re-
port was prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Envi-
ronment Public Works to help Congress sort out the often conflicting
claims about the effectiveness of major policy instruments.  Congres-
sional interest in what may, at first, appear to be a somewhat arcane
topic grew out of experimentation with policy tools that use or im-
prove market forces.  For example, several of these experiments were
contained in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.5  As Congress
faced reauthorization of other major pieces of environmental legisla-
tion, many had high—sometimes too high—expectations of what
these approaches could accomplish.  Others were suspicious—some-
times too suspicious—about whether they could provide meaningful
protection.
The “user’s guide” that we developed presents a pragmatic set of
instructions to help decision-makers narrow the choice of instruments
for addressing a particular problem.  First, the Report describes
twelve policy tools and how and where they are currently being used.
4. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, REP. NO. OTA-ENV-634,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS—A USER’S GUIDE (1995),
<http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/> [hereinafter OTA REPORT].  Dr. Friedman, Ms. Down-
ing, and Dr. Gunn were primary authors of this report.  The following individuals contributed
background analyses to the OTA Report: Gary C. Bryner, Damaris Christensen, Don H. Gar-
ner, George R. Heaton, Donald T. Hornstein, Barnett M. Lawrence, Jan Linsenmeyer, Stephen
Lipmann, Thomas O. McGarity, Kirsten Oldenburg, Pat  Parenteau, Barry G. Rabe, Clifford S.
Russell, Sidney A. Shapiro, Daniel Tarlock, and Kathryn Wagner.
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994).
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Then, we rated the relative effectiveness of these tools in achieving
each of seven criteria often considered when evaluating and creating
environmental policy.  The ratings were based on state, federal and
international experiences, as well as on scholarly literature.  Third,
because the strengths and weaknesses of a policy tool depend greatly
on the environmental problem being addressed,6 we provided a series
of key questions to be considered along with our judgments about
“typical” instrument performance.  Given a decision-maker’s prefer-
ences for certain criteria, this framework draws attention to those in-
struments which might be particularly effective—or warrant some
caution—in addressing a particular problem.
This Comment provides a brief comparison of how Richards’ ef-
fort to frame instrument choice compares with our OTA Report’s ap-
proach in order to help the reader see how the two are linked, yet
clearly quite different in scope and intent.  We then turn to the issue
of how such instrument choice analyses can be made most useful to
decision-makers who must address current and future environmental
problems in the face of competing claims and interests.
II.  THE INSTRUMENT CHOICE PROBLEM
Both Richards’ article and the OTA Report break the instrument
choice problem into four distinct tasks: 1) identification of the instru-
ments themselves, 2) a taxonomy or categorization of these instru-
ments, 3) criteria for judging the desirability of instruments, and 4) a
procedure for synthesizing all of the information above to help a pol-
icy-maker choose an instrument to solve a specific policy problem.7
The relative emphasis, however, is quite different in each.  For exam-
ple, Richards stresses instrument taxonomy (“dimensions”)8 while we
stress evaluation criteria as the key factor for framing instrument
choice.  First, we will explain what each task involves, borrowing
heavily from the field of biology, and then we will compare how Ri-
chards and the OTA Report develop and use each task to inform
choices.
Task 1 is to list—and in the OTA Report, define and describe—
the instruments themselves.  Taxes, marketable permits, and
6. See Giandomenico Majone, Choice Among Policy Instruments for Pollution Control, 2
POLICY ANALYSIS 589 (1976).
7. See generally Richards, supra note 1, at 226, 232, 254-55; OTA Report, supra note 4, at
7-29, 143-98.
8. See Richards, supra note 1, at 233-54.
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emissions standards are all examples of the “phenomena” that we are
trying to understand.  In some senses, these instruments can be con-
sidered the equivalent of organisms: their existence is independent of
the biologists that endeavor to classify them, but like organisms, they
are often difficult to classify into species.
Although they do not look alike, Great Danes and Chihuahuas
can both be easily identified as being of the same species because they
meet the functional test of being able to interbreed.  On the other
hand, blackberries (subgenus Eubatus of the genus Rubus) are harder
to categorize since they reproduce asexually, and thus cannot be clas-
sified based on a simple functional test.  Consequently, they have
been classified at various times into just a few species and at other
times into a few hundred.
Richards presents sixteen different groupings of instruments (in-
cluding his and OTA’s)9 that differ, not only in their categorization
scheme, but also in their lists of instruments. Deposit/refund, the
common name for the approach often used to encourage people to
return their bottles and cans, is considered a separate instrument un-
der several of the categorization schemes that Richards reviews.10  In
contrast, both Richards and OTA consider it a joint application of a
tax and a subsidy.  Either approach is viable: the task of naming in-
struments is important only insofar as it helps a policy- or decision-
maker understand the suite of choices he or she faces without having
to review hundreds of previous applications.  And, much of this help
comes from the information contained in other pieces of the puzzle.
Comparing the entries in the sixteen groupings Richards lists reveals,
surprisingly, more uniform “naming” for the market-oriented instru-
ments than for the more traditional approaches under the Clean Air
Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act (CWA).11
Task 2 involves further categorization of these instruments into a
taxonomy (or “dimensions,” as Richards prefers) in order to develop
a useful decision-making framework.  In biology, the purpose of clas-
sifying above the species level—into genus, family, and so on—is to
9. See id. at 238, 245, 284-85.
10. See id. at 253, 284-285.
11. See id. at 284-285.  Indeed, Congress adds to the diversity of names. See, e.g., Clean Air
Act (CAA) , 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (provision “...to reduce ... annual emissions of sulfur dioxide ...
by requiring compliance ... with prescribed emission limitations ... which ... may be met by an
emission allocation and transfer system”); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (setting standards of
performance for new sources which “reflect the degree of emission limitation achievable
through the application of the best system of emission reduction which ... the Administrator
determines has been adequately demonstrated”).
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capture the evolutionary relationships among species.  Richards states
that in his taxonomy, “the instruments are organized according to the
role that the government plays in each.”12  Thus, his seven dimensions
include, for example, whether the government is passive versus inter-
ventionist, how much government controls the selection of abatement
practices, whether the costs are born by government/society or pri-
vate parties, and whether the government controls prices or quanti-
ties.13
Our taxonomy is organized from a slightly different perspec-
tive—by looking at the flexibility of the instrument requirements
from the perspective of the regulated entities.  We ask: are the pollu-
tion quantities (or targets) fixed or not, and if fixed, must they be met
by every single source, or cumulatively by multiple sources?
Richards’ broad taxonomy applies to more environmental issues
than the OTA study, such as natural resources management.  The
OTA study limited its purview to the major pollution control laws
(CAA, CWA, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)).14
Under these laws, regulated entities are generally responsible for
cleaning up their own pollution.  The study focuses on the rules gov-
erning these regulated entities (regardless of their status as a public or
private entity), and ignores the aspect in which the federal govern-
ment subsidizes pollution abatement projects, such as construction of
sewage treatment plants by localities.  Generally, the federal govern-
ment provides clean-up services only in cases where government is
the polluter (e.g., defense waste) or when the responsible parties can-
not be found (Superfund), and there has been little support in recent
Congresses to expand this role.
Richards points out that government may be expanding its role
in the case of carbon sequestration to control atmospheric concentra-
tions of carbon dioxide.15  If true, his taxonomy is particularly appro-
priate.  But even here, if the United States signs the Kyoto Protocol,
it will be the regulated entity.  Nevertheless, Richards’ taxonomy is
much more useful for resource management issues, where it is gener-
ally considered quite legitimate for the federal government to be the
producer of goods and services.
Task 3 is to define the criteria by which instrument performance
is judged.  Richards states that the preferred instrument “minimize[s]
12. See id. at 232.
13. See id. at 233-54.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7671q; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387;  42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k.
15. See Richards, supra note 1, at 275-77.
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the social cost of achieving a given environmental goal” in light of
certain legal and political constraints.16  Richards’ formulation of so-
cial costs includes the usual list of direct abatement costs and transac-
tions costs, but adds another factor that is typically ignored—public
finance impacts.  He quite usefully points out that, with respect to this
last criterion, subsidies are at the bottom of the heap.17
Richards asserts that instrument choice is, at its core, a cost opti-
mization problem: choose the least cost instrument, unless it is not
within the “feasible set” due to a legal or political constraint.18  Our
formulation of the choice issue is quite different.  Certainly, instru-
ment choice involves tradeoffs, but the list of criteria to be considered
covers a much broader set of societal concerns than costs alone.  The
OTA Report grouped these criteria into three central, yet broad cate-
gories:  environmental results, costs and burdens, and change.19  No
single criterion or group of criteria is paramount, as cost acts in Ri-
chards’ approach.  Nor is the relative importance of each criterion
assumed to be the same among all decision-makers, or even among all
environmental problems.
All else being equal, policy-makers will certainly favor lower
costs, but all else is seldom equal.20  For example, environmental goals
are not inviolate constraints, as the history of slipped deadlines under
every major piece of environmental legislation amply illustrates.
Thus, some policy-makers will prefer the least-cost instrument, while
others will be willing to trade higher costs for greater assurance of
reaching the goal.  Moreover, the willingness of an individual deci-
sion-maker to make this tradeoff may vary according to the charac-
teristics of the problem, including riskiness, cost, and other concerns.
Similarly, environmental equity concerns are of greater importance to
some policy-makers than others, the ability to spur technological in-
novation is of greater importance for solving some environmental
problems than others, and so on.  The cost-minimization criterion fa-
vored by Richards does not square with our observations of Congres-
sional decision-making.
16. See id. at 228.
17. See id. at 271-272.
18. See id. at 230.
19. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 144.
20. See, e.g., Majone, supra note 6, at 602-603 (explaining that “[e]conomic efficiency is
clearly inadequate as a criterion for choosing among policy instruments.  We see this once we
admit that efficiency and equity considerations, often usefully distinguished in more limited
contexts, cannot be separated in policy-making.”).
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Task 4, undertaken by both Richards and OTA, is to devise a
procedure for synthesizing all of the information above in a manner
that will help a policy-maker choose an instrument to solve a specific
policy problem.  Richards does this by summarizing some “heuristic
principles for environmental applications.”21  Richards’ Table 3 pres-
ents a rough rating of the attractiveness of five instruments with re-
gard to the cost criteria and legal constraints (eight criteria in total)
discussed in the previous task.22
Similarly, the OTA report presents an evaluation of the twelve
instruments it covers with regard to its seven major evaluation crite-
ria;23 it also includes a detailed table24 containing twenty-six criteria
breakdowns, reflecting the diversity of concern among business, envi-
ronmentalist, and government stakeholders.  In addition, it offers a
series of “key questions for matching policy tools to problems” to
help a policy-maker, or more likely his or her staff, navigate through
the almost bewildering array of evaluations.25
The difference in the relative emphasis among the four tasks pre-
sented above might most easily be explained by the stated goals of the
two efforts.  Richards’ purpose is “to provide a conceptual framework
for understanding” policy instruments.26  Our goal is to provide a
framework for choosing, that is, a set of toolbox instructions that has
been missing, and thus our OTA Report title—Environmental Policy
Tools:  A User’s Guide.
III.  THE TOOLBOX
Environmental policy tools could be categorized in any number
of ways, depending on which attributes one wishes to emphasize.
One useful approach is to group twelve policy instruments into two
major categories depending on whether or not they impose fixed
pollution reduction targets.  These two categories help focus attention
on a common concern in environmental policy—namely, the extent to
which particular behavior is mandated by regulation.  Table 1 pro-
vides a brief description of each of the twelve policy tools.  Figure 1
shows how frequently each instrument is used in the approximately
21. See Richards, supra note 1, at 278-281.
22. See id. at 280.
23. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 198-200.
24. See id. at 199.
25. See id. at 34.
26. See Richards, supra note 1, at 224.
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thirty major pollution control programs under the CAA, CWA and
RCRA.
TABLE 1: THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLBOX
Tools With Fixed Pollution Reduction Targets
Focus on single sources or products:
Harm-based
Standards
A harm-based standard prescribes the end result, not the means, of
regulatory compliance.  Regulated entities are responsible for meeting
some regulatory target, but are largely free to choose or invent the
easiest or cheapest methods to comply.  Sometimes referred to as
health-based standards or performance standards, harm-based
standards are widely used, primarily in combination with design
standards.
Design Standards A design standard is a requirement expressed in terms of the state of
the art of pollution abatement at some point in time, for example, “best
available”27 or “best practicable”28 technology. In a permit, design
standard requirements are typically, but not always, stated as the level
of emissions control the model approach is capable of achieving.
Design standards written as emissions limits allow individual sources
the freedom to achieve the required emissions control by using the
model approach or equivalent means.  Design standards are very widely
used, most often as part of a technology-based strategy.
Technology
Specifications
A technology specification is a requirement expressed in terms of
specific equipment or techniques.  The standard is to be met by all
entities; facilities are not free to choose their means of pollution
abatement or prevention.  Explicit technology specifications in statutes
or regulations are very rare.  However, some design standards can be
considered de facto technology specifications when it is extremely
difficult to prove to the regulatory agency that an alternative is
equivalent to the model technology.
Product Bans and
Limitations
This regulatory approach bans or restricts production, processing,
distribution, use, or disposal of substances that present unacceptable
risks to health or the environment.  It focuses on the commodity itself,
rather than polluting byproducts.  As a result, the instrument is used
most heavily under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA)29 and other statutes where the hazard is the commodity.
27. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
28. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A).
29. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
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Focus on multiple sources or products:
Tradeable
Emissions
Emissions trading is achieved through government-issued permits that
allow the owner to emit a specific quantity of pollutants over a specified
period of time, and which can be bought from and sold to others.  The
government typically caps aggregate emissions from sources within a
geographic region by issuing only the number of permits consistent with
environmental goals.  A relatively new approach to tradeable emissions
is an “open market” approach where unregulated sources may
voluntarilly opt into the program.  Emissions trading has been used most
widely under the Clean Air Act,30 and to a more limited degree to
address water quality issues. 31
Integrated
Permitting
Integrated permits contain facility-wide emission limits, either for a
single pollutant across multiple individual sources or media, or for
several pollutants emitted to a single medium.  An integrated permit
might use one or several other environmental policy instruments.
“Bubble” permits are used under the Clean Air Act, and to a very
limited extent under the Clean Water Act.32  Other types of integrated
permits are still uncommon but are being studied as part of several state
pilot projects.
Challenge
Regulation
Challenge regulations ask target groups to change their behavior and
work toward a specific environmental goal, with mandatory
requirements imposed if the goal is not reached.  The government
identifies a goal and gives the groups time to select and implement an
effective means of achieving it.  As a result, challenge regulations have
the potential to be a less-intrusive way to achieve environmental goals.
The concept of challenge regulation is attracting interest, but is still
uncommon as a stand-alone regulatory tool.
30. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o.
31. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-800-R-96-001, DRAFT
FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASED TRADING (May 1996) [hereinafter WATERSHED-
BASED TRADING] <http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framework.html>.
32. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement:  General Principles for Creation, Banking,
and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed.Reg. 43814 (December 4, 1986) [hereinafter
Policy Statement](describing the bubble policy under the CAA); Standards of Performance for
New Stationary Sources, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (1987) (allowing an air bubble method as an alterna-
tive means of compliance); Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category Effluent Limi-
tations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 40 C.F.R.
pt. 420 (1982)(creating the iron and steel water bubble).
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Tools Without Fixed Pollution Reduction Targets
Pollution Charges With pollution charges, a regulated entity must pay a fixed dollar
amount for each unit of pollution emitted or disposed.  Pollution charges
do not set a limit on emissions or production.  Instead, the government
must calculate what charge will change the behavior of regulated entities
enough to achieve environmental objectives.  Sources are free to choose
whether to emit pollution and pay the charge, or to pay for the
installation of controls to reduce emissions.  This report considers only
those charges set high enough to significantly alter environmentally
harmful behavior, not charges used primarily for raising revenues.  In
the United States, pollution charges have been used for solid waste
control, 33 but rarely for control of other types of pollution.
Liability Liability provisions require entities that cause environmental harm to pay
those who are harmed to the extent of the damage.  Liability can provide a
significant motivation for behavioral change because the dollar amounts in-
volved can be huge.  This report focuses on statutory liability, not common
law theories of liability or enforcement penalties.  Several environmental
statutes impose statutory liability, including the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Oil
Pollution Act.34
Information
Reporting
Information reporting requires targeted entities to provide specified types of
information to a government agency or to the public directly.  Required infor-
mation typically involves activities affecting environmental quality, such as
emissions, product characteristics, or whether risk to the public exceeds a
threshold.
Subsidies Subsidies are financial assistance given to entities as an incentive to
change their behavior, or to help defray costs of mandatory standards.
Subsidies might be provided by the government or by other parties, who
thus bear part of the cost of environmentally beneficial controls or
behavior.  Historically, government subsidies have been widely used,
particularly in wastewater treatment.35  Subsidies from other parties are
becoming more common as government budgets shrink.
33. See, e.g., DON FULLERTON & THOMAS KINNAMAN, HOUSEHOLD DEMAND FOR
GARBAGE AND RECYCLING COLLECTION WITH THE START OF A PRICE PER BAG (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4670, 1994); SUMMARY OF PROJECT
88/ROUND II WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS:  INCENTIVE-BASED POLICIES FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID
WASTE MANAGEMENT (Kennedy School of Government, CSIA Discussion Paper 91-7, 1991).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994).
35. See, e.g., Clean Water Act , 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1299, §§ 1381-1387.
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Technical
Assistance
The government offers technical assistance to help targeted entities
prevent or reduce pollution.  These programs educate sources that might
not be fully aware of the environmental consequences of their actions, or
of techniques or equipment to reduce those consequences.  Technical
assistance may take many forms, including manuals and guidance,
training programs, and information clearinghouses.  Some types of
technical assistance, such as facility evaluations, are conditioned on
facilities agreeing to respond with environmentally beneficial behavior.
Technical assistance is very common, particularly in combination with
other tools.
FIGURE 1:  Policy Tools Used in the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
           and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Extent of Use in CAA, CWA, and RCRA
(Frequency of use in 32 major programs)
0 to 5 %
5 to 15 %
15 to 35 %
35 to 75 %
more than 75%
Tools without  fixed targets
Technical assistance
Subsidies
Information reporting
Liability
Pollution charges
Tools with fixed targets
     Multi-source
Challenge regulations
Tradeable emissions
Integrated permitting
     Single-source
Harm-based standards
Design standards
Technology specifications
Product bans
SOURCE:  Office of Technology Assessment, 1995
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A.  Tools with Fixed Pollution Reduction Targets
Policy instruments that impose regulatory limits on environmen-
tally harmful behavior vary in the extent to which they specify how a
target entity should comply with emission limitations.  For example,
technology specifications might require the use of a specific pollution
control device, while a harm-based standard prescribes a compliance
target and leaves regulated entities free to choose their own method
of compliance.  Another significant indicator of flexibility is whether
the tool focuses on single sources, or sets limits on cumulative emis-
sions from multiple sources.
Tools that focus on single sources of pollution require regulated
entities themselves to comply with emission limitations or face associ-
ated civil or criminal penalties.  These tools are often called “tradi-
tional” or “command-and-control” approaches because historically,
they have been the most heavily used category of tools, and they of-
ten allow less flexibility than multi-source tools.
1.  Single-Source Tools
Tools that focus on single sources of pollution include product
bans and limitations, harm-based standards, design standards, and
technology specifications.  Product bans and limitations ban or restrict
manufacture, distribution, use or disposal of substances that present
unreasonable risks to health or the environment.  Product bans and
limitations focus on the commodity itself rather than the polluting by-
products from its manufacturing.  Harm-based standards prescribe the
end results of regulatory compliance, not the means.  Desired end re-
sults are based on health and environmental effects of different pollu-
tion levels and patterns.  In contrast, the end results required by de-
sign standards are based on what a model technology might achieve.
Sources are free to use the model technology or demonstrate that an-
other technology or technique achieves equivalent results.  Technol-
ogy specifications designate the technology or technique a source
must use to control its pollution.  In its “pure” form, the specification
is explicit.
A brief note on the misunderstood policy tool of design stan-
dards is in order.  Design standards can, and often do, present a much
more flexible regulatory challenge to firms than the technology strait-
jacket they are frequently likened to.  The confusion arises from how
an agency uses model technologies when translating a general statu-
tory standard into an enforceable limitation.  A statute prescribing
design standards typically uses broad terms to describe the level of
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control technology it expects pollution sources to implement, such as
“reasonably available control technology” or “maximum achievable
control technology.”36  Such broad expressions of effectiveness do not
provide enough detail about what regulated entities must do to com-
ply with the law.  When implementing a design standard, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the applicable state agency
will have to determine what stringency of emission control is associ-
ated with the standard.  If the standard is, for example, any “reasona-
bly available control technology,” the agency must first decide which
entities are representative of the target group, and then determine
what technology is reasonably available based upon those representa-
tive entities.  The agency can then calculate the level of emissions
control that occurs when a source uses the chosen model control
technology.  Design standards are typically imposed on individual
sources through permits with specific numeric or narrative emissions
control requirements. Because firms have the freedom to achieve
those limits by using either the model control technology or an ap-
proach that achieves equivalent results, design standards do not ex-
plicitly dictate the technology that firms must use.  The OTA team
could not identify a single design standard that explicitly mandated a
specific technology, without allowing equivalent approaches as an al-
ternative.  That said, firms may react to design standards as if they
were a technology specification, if they choose to “play it safe” by
picking the model technology known to achieve the required level of
pollution control, or if they have no practical opportunity to demon-
strate equivalency of alternative approaches.  Note that this inflexi-
bility arises primarily from how the policy tool is implemented, not
from inherent characteristics of the tool itself.
Single-source tools seem to be effective choices where environ-
mental results are of primary concern, and where there is less of a fo-
cus on costs.  Although the tools provide varying levels of flexibility
when telling sources “what to do,” they all establish explicit emission
targets for each source, and therefore, provide a relatively straight-
forward basis for verifying compliance.  As a result, single-source
tools are the most effective of the dozen tools that we consider in this
article for providing assurance that environmental goals will be met.
However, they are not as effective for addressing concerns about
minimizing compliance costs because they are relatively less flexible
than other instruments, and thus reduce opportunities for achieving
36. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(c)(1), 7412(d)(2).
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goals in a cost-effective manner.  In addition, they can impose sub-
stantial administrative burdens on regulatory agencies and regulated
entities.
2.  Multi-Source Tools
Some policy instruments that impose regulatory limits on pollu-
tion focus on multiple sources rather than a single source.  Multi-
source tools allow a regulated entity additional flexibility in how it
complies with emission limitations.  A polluter has two options; it can
change its own behavior to fit within the prescribed limitations, or it
can arrange with another entity to have the second entity comply with
the limitations on its behalf.  This ability to transfer or negotiate re-
sponsibility among entities for changing behavior distinguishes multi-
source from single-source tools.
Multi-source tools include tradeable emissions, challenge regula-
tion, and integrated permitting.  A tradeable emissions program often
consists of government-issued permits that are transferable.  The gov-
ernment agency sets a level of aggregate emissions consistent with
environmental goals by issuing only the number of permits corre-
sponding to that level of emissions.  Entities are then allowed to
transfer their permits; they might choose to do so if the relative costs
of emissions control make it more profitable, or less expensive, to
transfer the permit to another entity.  A relatively new use of trade-
able emissions is in “open markets,” in which government does not
issue permits up front, but where regulated or unregulated sources
may voluntarily opt into the program.
With challenge regulation, the government establishes a clear,
measurable target with a timetable for implementation, but the mul-
tiple sources in a target category are given responsibility for designing
and implementing their own programs to achieve that target.  Chal-
lenge regulation differs from other purely voluntary programs in that
the government specifies a credible alternative program, or sanction
that will be imposed should progress toward targets be unsatisfactory.
Integrated permitting incorporates multiple requirements into a
single permit over an entire facility, rather than having a permit for
each emissions source within the facility.  A facility-wide integrated
permit might list emissions limits for each source within the facility, or
the permit might list a single limit per pollutant for the entire facility,
allowing the facility to use any combination of controls to meet an
overall emissions cap.  A multimedia integrated permit also may
combine limitations on emissions to air, water, and land in a single
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permit, thereby taking into account the potential for pollution to
move between media.
Multi-source tools are an effective choice when resource de-
mands are of particular concern, and environmental results a close
second.  The tools allow facilities to seek the most cost-effective ap-
proach to achieving a particular level of aggregate emissions, whether
through negotiation of emissions control responsibilities with other
facilities or through use of an integrated permit with flexible source
emission limits at a particular facility.  Multi-source tools still require
a particular level of pollution abatement, and thus provide a signifi-
cant degree of assurance that environmental goals will be met, al-
though perhaps less assurance than with the straightforward, single-
source tools.  The actual degree of assurance depends on the capabil-
ity to monitor regulated pollutants.
B.  Tools Without Fixed Pollution Reduction Targets
The second major category of tools shown in Table 1 comprises
tools that encourage pollution prevention and control without setting
specific emissions targets.  Some of these instruments are nonregula-
tory in nature, while others require a particular action, such as pay-
ment per unit of emissions or submission of an emissions report.
Note that even the regulatory tools in this category require something
other than a specific level of pollution prevention or control.  Tools
that move behavior in the desired direction fall into two subgroups:
tools that make it easier or less expensive to lower pollution by pro-
viding knowledge or financial assistance, and tools that raise the fi-
nancial stakes of continuing to behave in environmentally harmful
ways.
Tools that encourage facilities to prevent or control pollution in-
clude technical assistance and subsidies.  Both approaches assume
that polluters will be more willing to change once they know of the
benefits of alternative types of behavior, and more likely to change if
the expense is, at least partially, offset by others.  Technical assistance
helps entities to make better environmental choices by clarifying the
environmental harms that are consequences of their actions, and dis-
cussing what techniques or equipment reduce those harms.  Technical
assistance may also be focused on educating the general public about
the environmental implications of existing and proposed programs
and policies.  Subsidies provide various forms of financial assistance
that can act as incentives for entities to change their behavior or can
help entities having financial difficulty to comply with imposed stan-
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dards.  Subsidies might be provided by the government or by other
parties.  They come in many forms:  grants, low- or no-interest loans,
preferential tax treatment, and deposit-refund systems.
Tools that increase the cost to those engaging in environmentally
harmful behavior include pollution charges, information reporting
and liability.  These tools are based on the assumption that sources
will emit less if their pollution costs them something, either as direct
payments to an agency or harmed parties, or indirectly in terms of
reputation.  Pollution charges require a regulated entity to pay a fixed
dollar amount for each unit of pollution emitted or disposed of.  Pol-
lution charges do not set a limit on emissions or production; instead,
the government must calculate what level of charge will change the
behavior of regulated entities enough to achieve environmental ob-
jectives.  Then, entities are free to choose whether to emit pollution
and pay the charge or to pay for the installation of controls to reduce
emissions subject to the charge.  In its assessment, OTA focused on
pollution charges that create behavioral incentives and do not merely
raise revenue.37
By helping to increase public awareness of entities’ pollution, in-
formation reporting affects target entity behavior somewhat less di-
rectly than pollution charges.  Here, the hope is that the public’s
heightened awareness will increase public support for pollution con-
trol programs, and thus entities will be encouraged to be “good
neighbors” and reduce their pollution.
Liability provisions require polluting entities to pay those who
are harmed by their pollution to the extent of the damage incurred.
Liability can provide entities with a significant motivation to engage
in environmentally sound behavior because of the huge dollar
amounts involved.  Liability is imposed two ways: by common-law
theories like negligence or nuisance, or by statute, such as in the
CERCLA.  The OTA Report considered only statutory liability, ex-
plicitly placing enforcement and compliance penalties as beyond its
scope.38  Obviously, however, enforcement and penalties are a neces-
sary component of any of the regulatory instruments described above
and can greatly increase the cost of environmentally harmful activi-
ties.
Behavior-modifying tools that do not set fixed pollution control
targets, are particularly appropriate if the decision-maker desires an
37. See OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
38. See id.
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environmental program that can readily adapt to changing science
and control capabilities.  Because these tools do not mandate any par-
ticular behavior, they should be used with caution where assurance of
meeting environmental goals is a primary criterion.
IV.  CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING INSTRUMENTS
In contrast to Richards, we aim a substantial portion of our “in-
strument choice” effort at identifying and describing the key criteria
that stakeholders use to determine the best instrument to apply to a
specific problem.  Experience indicates that instruments are seldom
chosen on the basis of their formal or theoretical properties, but
rather, are chosen for their known or perceived performance with re-
gard to those criteria decision-makers and their constituents value
most.39
Looking broadly at various environmental literatures and talking
with a wide range of experts, we can identify three broad themes that
have been the most prominent.  The first—environmental results—
addresses the public’s demand, not only that we meet our goals, but
also that we pursue these goals in appropriate ways.  The second—
lower costs and burdens—addresses the public’s concern that we
pursue our environmental goals at the lowest possible cost and with
the fairest allocation of burdens among companies and between
government and industry.  The third—change—reflects a growing
consensus that adaptable programs, which facilitate continual
improvements in policies, may be essential for encouraging new
scientific and technological solutions.  Turning to particular details,
Table 2 identifies seven criteria that policy-makers typically consider
when adopting environmental programs.
39. For an earlier argument of this point, see Majone, supra note 6, at 603.
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TABLE 2:  CRITERIA AND FACTORS USED FOR
COMPARING INSTRUMENTS
CRITERIA FACTORS
Costs and Burdens
COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND FAIRNESS
Are we protecting human health and the envi-
ronment at the lowest possible cost and with
the fairest allocation of burdens for sources?
• Cost-effectiveness for society
• Cost-effectiveness for sources
• Fairness to sources
• Administrative burden for sources
DEMANDS ON GOVERNMENT
Are we protecting human health and the envi-
ronment at the lowest possible cost and with
the best use of resources for government?
• Cost
• Ease of analysis
Environmental Results
ASSURANCE OF MEETING GOALS
Do stakeholders have confidence that environ-
mental goals will be or have been met?
• Action forcing
• Monitoring capability
• Familiarity with use
POLLUTION PREVENTION
Can the approach promote use of strategies for
preventing rather than controlling pollution?
• Giving prevention an advantage
• Focusing on learning
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY AND JUSTICE
Does the approach seek equality of outcomes,
full participation by affected communities in
decision-making, and freedom from bias in
policy implementation?
• Distributional outcomes
• Effective participation
• Remediation
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Change
ADAPTABILITY
How easily can the approach be adapted to new
scientific information or abatement capabil-
ity?
• Ease of program modification
• Ease of change for sources
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND
DIFFUSION
Are we encouraging new ways to achieve our
environmental goals that lead to improved
performance in quality and costs?
• Innovation in the regulated indus-
tries
• Innovation in the EG&S industry
• Diffusion of known technologies
A.  Environmental Results
Congress sometimes chooses voluntary approaches for accom-
plishing environmental goals; at other times, it requires specific ac-
tions to improve human health and the environment.  Yet, even when
Congress has required specific actions, results have often fallen short
of achieving the desired goal.40  Thus, for many stakeholders in the
environmental policy community, the most important priority contin-
ues to be working toward satisfactory environmental results.
1.  Assurance of Meeting Goals41
When it comes to very serious environmental risks, the public is
likely to want assurance that goals will be met.  In fact, such assurance
may be the “bottom line” criterion for many stakeholders, especially
when the environmental problem poses serious risks to human health.
In recent years, for example, community scrutiny of facilities using
toxic or hazardous substances has increased, and has even included
efforts to block siting.  In such a context, choosing policies that pro-
vide assurance of achieving the desired results may seem more impor-
40. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT (1990) [hereinafter CEQ Report].
41. Parts of this section are based on THOMAS O. MCGARITY, ASSURANCE OF MEETING
ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS (May 1994) (unpublished contractor report prepared for the Office
of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C.) (on file with authors).
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tant than satisfying criteria that might otherwise be favored.  At the
national level, reports assessing progress toward protecting human
health and the environment indicate that we are still far short of our
desired goals.42
a.  Degree of Action-Forcing
Central to the concept of assurance is the extent to which an in-
strument has “teeth,” or the capacity to force emitters to undertake
actions needed to attain environmental goals.  These action-forcing
instruments specify pollution reduction results and provide a means
for holding emitters accountable for their pollution.  The relative im-
portance of action-forcing for a stakeholder or decision-maker may
depend in large part on his or her assessment of what drives the be-
havior of sources or targeted industries.  Some believe that if industry
is provided a clear goal or target of pollution reduction and a reason-
able timetable for action, a forcing action or level is not necessary for
goal attainment.  However, others believe that only those instruments
that contain a “lever” for forcing action provide sufficient pressure
and accountability to assure that individuals, facilities, or firms will
have to change their behavior until the goal has been met.
b.  Monitoring Capability
Monitoring capability has two components: the capacity to de-
termine whether or not the source is doing what is required for com-
pliance, and the capacity to determine whether or not progress is be-
ing made toward the overall environmental goal.  The level of confi-
dence that goals will be met is influenced by how easy or difficult it
will be to monitor results.  For example, a technology-based strategy
utilizing “percent reductions” in emissions or a “best available tech-
nology” approach is inherently easier to monitor than a risk-based
strategy that designates an ambient environmental quality goal across
multiple sources.  Instrument performance that is relatively easy to
monitor increases the opportunities for eventual accountability, en-
forcement, and evaluation of instrument effectiveness.
A stakeholder’s sense of assurance may also be influenced by the
availability of adequate monitoring technologies, and the type of
monitoring regime used.  For example, continuous monitoring may be
considered by some to be essential for individual sources even though
42. See, e.g., CEQ Report, supra note 40.
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systematic, yet less sophisticated and less frequent monitoring, may
be sufficient for others.
c.  Familiarity Through Use
If an instrument has been used with any success in the past, pol-
icy-makers may have more confidence in using that instrument in the
future.  In fact, some instruments may be heavily used primarily be-
cause people already know how to implement them and have institu-
tional arrangements that make it easy to continue using them.  Espe-
cially when dealing with problems that have very serious, short-term
consequences, the public may want policy-makers to use those in-
struments which are “tried and true,” even though they may not
achieve all or even any of the other major criteria.
2.  Pollution Prevention
The public is also concerned with how society meets its goals.
For example, there has been increasing support for the idea that pol-
luters should be asked to try their best to prevent, rather than control,
pollution.  Polluters can use pollution prevention strategies to meet or
exceed environmental goals—strategies that seek the reduction of all
non-product outputs, regardless of medium, restricted only by the
limits of current process and product technology.
At the federal level, the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (PPA)
does not mandate complete pollution prevention, but does require
pollution prevention when feasible.43  In addition, it requires certain
firms to report, through the Toxics Release Inventory system,44 on
their “source reduction” activities.45  At the state level, as of 1994,
thirty states had enacted pollution prevention statutes, over half of
which included provisions for pollution prevention facility planning.
Some had also set statewide numerical pollution reduction goals.46
Despite these initiatives, both policy-makers and firms fail to
adopt pollution prevention strategies as an alternative to pollution
control in many instances, even when they may be less expensive in
43. See The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b) (1994) [hereinafter
PPA].
44. See id. at § 13106.
45. See id. at § 13102.  The PPA defines “source reduction” as any practice “which reduces
the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant entering any waste stream or
otherwise released into the environment (including fugitive emissions) prior to recycling, treat-
ment, or disposal; and…reduces the hazards to public health and the environment…”
46. See OTA Report, supra 4, at n. 195.
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the long run.  Continued reliance on control strategies may stem from
a lack of awareness or information about pollution prevention, regu-
latory disincentives (or lack of incentives), or economic and institu-
tional issues.47  Therefore, in order for policy-makers to encourage
pollution prevention strategies, some of the changes discussed below
should be made.
a.   Give an Advantage to Prevention
For both regulators and regulated entities, staying with known
control technologies is the least risky choice.  Even when regulations
provide some flexibility of choice, the costs, operational conditions,
and monitoring capabilities of known technologies are all predictable.
Requiring or facilitating the use of pollution-prevention strategies
over pollution-control strategies could improve the effectiveness of
instruments.
b.  Focus on Organizational Learning
Both private and public sector experts typically specialize in ei-
ther air, water or waste management, areas that involve unique terms,
technologies and institutional concerns.  Moving away from this pat-
tern of specialization toward broad prevention strategies may require
a considerable shift of thought within organizations.  Such a shift
brings organizational issues to the forefront, issues including:  how a
firm is structured to make decisions about environmental issues; who
makes the key decisions; whether top management demonstrates a
commitment to prevention, makes resources available and rewards
workers for their efforts; and the firm’s capacity for flexibility in pro-
duction processes.48
In most medium- to large-sized industrial firms, links between
the production and environmental units have been weak.49  Since
pollution prevention seeks to integrate the idea of prevention into
47. See, e.g., JOEL S. HIRSCHHORN & KIRSTEN U. OLDENBERG, PROSPERITY WITHOUT
POLLUTION: THE PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR INDUSTRY AND CONSUMERS (1991);
MINNESOTA OFFICE OF WASTE MANAGEMENT, REPORT ON BARRIERS TO POLLUTION
PREVENTION (March 1991).
48. See, e.g., Randy S. Price, Benchmarking Pollution Prevention: A Review of Best-In-
Class Facility Programs, 4 POLLUTION PREVENTION REV. 93 (Winter 1993-94).
49. See Peter B. Cebon, The Myth of Best Practices: The Context Dependence of Two Waste
Reduction Programs, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY 167 (Kurt Fischer &
Johan Schot eds., 1993).
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production design, organizational leadership or even an agent of
change at the facility level may be essential for accomplishing this
objective.
3.  Environmental Equity and Justice
Community-based groups have been increasingly successful in
their efforts to raise awareness about environmental justice and eq-
uity concerns at all levels of policy-making.  Traditionally, concern
about the distributional effects of environmental protection policies
focused primarily on either the relative costs and burdens placed on
particular industries, or on the differential impacts on control sources
because of size or age.50  Less attention was given to understanding
how these policies might redistribute environmental risks and benefits
among individuals.51  In fact, the thrust of much of the theoretical lit-
erature has been that environmental protection might hurt low-
income individuals by eliminating jobs or forcing facilities to relocate.
Over the past decade, however, even these traditional concerns
about environmental equity have been refocused on determining the
extent to which specific groups of Americans may bear a dispropor-
tionate burden of environmental risks.  This new focus is now widely
referred to as “environmental justice.”52
The body of empirical research investigating this focus is also
relatively new.  However, initial studies indicate that some minority
and low-income communities have experienced adverse impacts from
discriminatory siting of facilities and from the implementation of en-
vironmental laws.53  These studies generally conclude that minorities
50. For further explanation, see discussion infra Part IV.B.4 Cost Effectiveness and Fair-
ness to Sources.
51. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing ‘Environmental Justice:’  The Distributional Ef-
fects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787 (1993).
52. The literature remains unsettled about which words best identify this new focus.  See,
e.g., Deeohn Ferris, A Challenge to EPA, 18 EPA J. 28 (Mar.-April 1992); Robert D. Bullard,
The Threat of Environmental Racism, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 23 (1993) [hereinafter Bul-
lard, Threat].
53. See generally COMMISSION ON RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT (Public Data Access,
1987); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice:  Weighing Race and Class as
Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921 (1992);
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (June 1, 1983); AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE
REGISTRY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE NATURE AND
EXTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES (1988); D. R. Wernette &
L. A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air: Minorities Are Disproportionately Exposed,  18 EPA J. 16
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and low-income communities are more likely to be exposed to higher
levels and multiple sources of environmental risks than are whites and
high-income neighborhoods.  A number of other interpretations of
this data have been offered, and further attempts are being made to
verify the data and, where possible, to clarify the reasons for and ex-
tent of disparities.54
Advocates of environmental justice seek to institute the follow-
ing set of “principles” for decision-making regarding environmental
issues: the “right to protection, prevention of harm, shifting the bur-
den of proof, obviating proof of intent to discriminate, and targeting
resources to redress inequities….”55  These principles address the con-
cerns of minorities and other vulnerable populations by restating en-
vironmental issues as issues of equity, social justice, and public health,
rather than conflicts requiring trade-offs between health and eco-
nomic well-being.56
Environmental equity and justice is now one of the standards
against which environmental protection policies are measured.57  For
example, federal agencies are now required to address the “dispro-
portionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects
of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and
low-income populations.”58  The EPA, which has characterized envi-
ronmental justice as concerned with identifying and addressing dis-
proportionately high and adverse human health or environmental ef-
fects in minority populations and in low-income populations, has in-
corporated it as one of its six “guiding principles” for strategic plan-
ning.59  More recently, the Clinton Administration’s “10 Principles for
(Mar.-April 1992) ; B. H. Wright, The Effects of Occupational Injury, Illness, and Disease on the
Health Status of Black Americans: A Review, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:  A TIME FOR DISCOURSE (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds.,
1992).
54. See, e.g, Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got To Do with It?  Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); Vicki Been, Locally
Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynam-
ics? 103 YALE L. J. 1383 (1994).
55. See Bullard, Threat, supra note 52, at 23.
56. See ROBERT  D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE (1994); Robert D. Bullard, Overcoming
Racism in Environmental Decision-making, 36 ENVIRONMENT 10, 12-20, 39-44 (May 1994).
57. See, e.g., OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND EVALUATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISKS FOR ALL COMMUNITIES,
(June 1992).
58. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
59. See OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at n. 213.
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Reinventing Environmental Protection” incorporated ideas of envi-
ronmental equity and justice, as well.60
Environmental equity and justice encompasses multiple issues,
ranging from funding additional research, to identifying the disparate
impacts of environmental policies, and developing more effective
strategies for achieving certain goals.  Key to securing environmental
justice is being able to determine the direct and indirect means of dis-
crimination.61 One major concern is that, through their neighbor-
hoods, jobs, and diet, these minority and low-income groups are ex-
posed to larger amounts of pollution than are other members of the
public.
Many of the strategies for pursuing environmental equity and
justice, while important, involve initiatives that fall outside the scope
of this assessment.  For example, efforts to reshape the siting proce-
dures for hazardous waste facilities within each states can be impor-
tant for achieving equity and justice goals.  However, procedural im-
provements for decision-making are not instrument-specific in effect.
a.  Distributional Outcomes of Policies
The redistribution of risks and benefits through implementation
of environmental laws occurs at varying geographic scales.  For ex-
ample, some areas of the country, notably urban areas such as Los
Angeles, have much higher concentrations of air pollutants, such as
ozone, than do rural areas.  Within a local community, there may be
large differences among neighborhoods in the relative exposure to
hazardous or toxic substances.  These types of inequities, especially in
the absence of compensating benefits, are a primary concern for
achieving environmental equity and justice.62
We considered two specific types of distributional outcomes that
are central in efforts to protect all members of the public.  First, envi-
ronmental equity and justice must seek to address the issue of protec-
tion for the most vulnerable populations, especially since evidence
exists that environmental regulatory agencies have failed to protect
60. See WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION (Mar. 16, 1995) <http://www.epa.gov/reinvent/notebook/clinton.html>.
61. See, e.g., Michel Gelobter, The Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 841 (1994).
62. Economists have assumed that winners will pay losers to “wash out” the distributional
inequities which ultimately develop in any real-world implementation of policies.  Generally,
this has not happened, although the idea of direct compensation for siting has been adopted by
some states. See Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is it Time to Pay Attention? 21
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 787, 811 (1994).
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these populations adequately in the past.63  In establishing water
quality standards, for example, fish consumption data are usually av-
eraged across populations and may miss special sensitivity within
smaller subgroups, such as Native Americans.64  According to envi-
ronmental justice advocates, it is on the characteristics of this more
sensitive group that regulations should be established since they not
only eat more fish, but also more of each fish, often including the
head and tail, parts that bioaccumulate higher levels of some toxic
substances.65
Second, once that level of protection is set, the actual levels of
exposure to pollutants should not differ across individuals or groups.
For example, if national standards are set for air pollution emissions,
this should be done to ensure that no individual be any more exposed
than any other individual.  Thus, differential exposure across areas of
the country or within local communities—so called “hot spots”—
would not be acceptable because everyone should have a “civil right
to equal protection” from environmental harm.66
b.  Effective Participation in Policy-making
Another major component of environmental equity and justice is
the establishment of informed and meaningful participation in all de-
cision-making arenas where specific environmental policies are de-
veloped.67  By forcing policy-makers to consult with communities and
local grass-roots leaders, proponents expect to achieve higher visibil-
ity for their ideas and change the regulatory culture for environ-
mental policy-making at the federal level.68  Often, a major difficulty
63. See Samara F. Swanston, Race, Gender, Age, and Disproportionate Impact:  What Can
We Do About the Failure To Protect the Most Vulnerable? 21 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 577, 586
(1994).
64. See Patrick C. West, Health Concerns for Fish-Eating Tribes: Government Assumptions
Are Much Too Low, 18 EPA J. 15 (Mar.-April 1992).
65. See Robert J. Knox, Environmental Equity, 55 J. ENVT’L HEALTH 32, 32 (May 1993).
66. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s
Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 523 (1994); Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism,
90 MICH. L. REV. 394 (1991); Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21
FORDHAM URB. L. J.  431 (1994).
67. See generally Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup:
Expanding Public Participation in the Federal Superfund Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L. J.  671
(1994).
68. See generally Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach
to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 495 (1992); Robert H. Frielich & Derek B.
Guemmer, Removing Artificial Barriers to Public Participation in Land-Use Policy: Effective
Zoning and Planning by Initiative and Referenda, 21 URB. LAW. 511 (1989); Torres, supra note
66.
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is the inability of minority and low-income communities to participate
as equals with industry and government.  Language barriers, conven-
ience of the forums, and lack of technical preparation are examples of
problems which may have to be overcome in order for individuals to
get involved in neighborhood and community problem-solving.69
c.   Remediation of Existing Problems
Some minority and poor communities have also experienced dis-
crimination when decisions have been made about siting hazardous
facilities and when priority sites for clean-up have been chosen.70  Yet
efforts to establish remediation through equal protection suits have
been generally unsuccessful.71  While remediation will continue to be
a concern in the short-run because communities cannot simply move
away from their problems, the ideal is to eliminate the need for reme-
diation efforts in the future by emphasizing pollution prevention
strategies.
B.  Costs and Burdens
Although meeting environmental goals remains a priority, the
public is also concerned that these goals be achieved at the lowest
possible cost, and with the fairest allocation of burden among compa-
nies and between government and industry.  Congress has seldom set
goals without including a concession to the costs and burdens im-
posed.  In some instances, however, the desire to provide for suffi-
cient protection of human health or the environment has resulted in
the use of strict source controls and additional requirements, such as
continuous monitoring, which have added significant costs and bur-
dens.
One of the most pervasive concerns about environmental protec-
tion programs in the United States has been that they are costly to
implement and thus reduce productivity and place firms at a competi-
tive disadvantage.  Certainly, identification and implementation of
policies that effectively improve both cost-effectiveness and fairness
69. See generally CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, CALIFORNIA
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY: PLANNING FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CALIFORNIA’S ENVIRONMENT, SUMMARY REPORT AND FINAL REPORT
(1994).
70. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Envi-
ronmental Law, NAT’L L. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1.
71. See generally Godsil, supra note 66.
FRIEDMAN_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  10:54 AM
354 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:327
has not been easy.  Richards’ examination of a cost minimization
framework is clearly a significant contribution to half of this puzzle.72
Concerns about demands on government have also intensified,
especially claims that some alternatives for protecting human health
and the environment place a significantly lighter burden on govern-
ment, either by shifting the burdens onto other groups (industry or
consumers) or by loosening the level of control altogether.  Richards’
“implementation costs” capture some of these ideas and his analysis
of public finance impacts deepens our understanding of the complex-
ity of costs and burdens.  On the other hand, his dimensions lack ade-
quate analysis of the many and complex differences that firms, or
regulated entities, present for the decision-maker.
1.  Cost-Effectiveness and Fairness to Sources73
Concern about the impact of environmental regulations on
United States productivity, as well as the impact of compliance costs
on polluters, has been a recurring theme in the environmental policy
community since the 1970s.  However, the impact of environmental
policy choices on cost-effectiveness and fairness has come under in-
creased scrutiny as the United States attempts to improve its econ-
omy with respect to other countries.74
One of the most pervasive criticisms of environmental regula-
tions in the United States has been that they force very inefficient ac-
tivities on sources and place heavy administrative demands on regula-
tory agencies.75  Such criticisms often assert that using different policy
instruments, particularly “economic incentives,” would accomplish
the same goals at lower costs for both polluters and the government.76
72. See generally Richards, supra note 1.
73. Parts of this section are based on CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL & PHILIP T. POWELL,
EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS OF CANDIDATE APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
MANAGEMENT, (unpublished contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assess-
ment, U.S. Congress, May 1994) (on file with the authors).
74. See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and
Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233 (199l); Steven J. Kline, Styles of Innovation and their Cultural
Basis, CHEMTECH, August 1991, at 472-480 [hereinafter Kline, Styles of Innovation]; September
1991, at 525; and November 1991, at 654; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, REP.
NO. OTA-ITE-586, INDUSTRY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: COMPETITIVE
CHALLENGES AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES (1994) [hereinafter OTA-ITE-586].
75. See generally OTA-ITE-586, supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); STEPHEN G.
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (Paul R. Portney, ed.., Resources for the Future, 1990); SCIENCE ADVISORY
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Evaluating which instruments use resources in the most efficient and
fair way, given an environmental goal, has sparked considerable aca-
demic and political debate over the past two and a half decades.77
However, a major barrier to adequately comparing the efficiency of
policy instruments has been the paucity and poor quality of informa-
tion on the social benefits of pollution abatement in comparison to
the availability of reasonable, if imperfect, estimates of compliance
costs.78
Moreover, there is little systematic empirical evidence that eco-
nomic incentives are effective in changing the behavior of polluters in
the desired direction.79  In fact, experiences with real-world imple-
mentation of these instruments suggest that the conclusions about
relative performance on efficiency that are derived from theoretical
studies, including those drawn in Richards’ article, should be inter-
preted cautiously.80  Yet, even when political compromises and nego-
tiation among stakeholders in a particular context make pure effi-
ciency unreasonable to seek, it may be possible to identify second-
best strategies, which allow at least some potential for cost-savings.
Despite continuing efforts to implement strategies that are both
cost-effective and fair across the board, most situations seem to re-
quire tradeoffs among some of the following components.
a.  Cost-Effectiveness for Society
Our framework does not attempt to assess the benefits or value
of a legislatively determined goal, but rather assumes that Congress
has chosen a statutory goal that captures the desirable level of social
benefits.81  Thus, cost-effectiveness for society is defined as the total
BOARD, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES
AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (September 1990).
77. See, e.g., Linda M. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey,
30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 675 (1992).
78. See Richard N. L. Andrews, Summary, in WORKSHOP ON EFFECTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON INDUSTRIAL COMPLIANCE COSTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION (1981); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, ASSESSING THE
COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION—STAFF WORKING PAPER (1988).
79. See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & ROBERT N. STAVINS, EVALUATING THE RELATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND DIRECTION REGULATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: IMPACTS ON THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY (Center for
Science and International Affairs, Discussion Paper 91-1, 1991).
80. See OTA-ITE-586, supra note 74, at 279-85.
81. See generally LESTER B. LAVE, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: DO THE BENEFITS EXCEED
THE COST? (Center for Science and International Affairs, Environment and Natural Resources
Program, Project 88/Round II Project Report 91-04, 1991); DAVID W. PEARCE & ANIL
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industry and government expenditures per unit of pollution abate-
ment required to meet the environmental goal.  The “maximum net
benefits” to society for accomplishing a particular goal would be
achieved by the instrument producing the lowest total of expenditures
by industry, government costs to implement the program and trans-
fers of money to and from government—for example, through taxes
or subsidies.
b.  Cost-Effectiveness for Individual Sources
Another measure of cost-effectiveness is at the firm level—that
is, whether the instrument allows a firm to minimize its costs for com-
pliance.  In most studies, the goal is assumed to be unchanging; thus
the regulator and the firm are interested in finding the least-cost solu-
tion in that particular context.82  Also important is the potential to
achieve cost-effectiveness over the long run, where an instrument al-
lows a firm the flexibility to continue seeking least-cost adjustments
over a period of time.  Richards acknowledges that the costs of moni-
toring, for example, may be a necessary condition for sources to gain
more flexibility in deciding how to meet environmental goals.83  Some
instruments may be cost-effective for society, but not for a firm, and
vice versa.  This is particularly true for those instruments that transfer
money from firms to government (taxes), or government to firms
(subsidies), which Richards underscores as duds for our public fi-
nance system.84
c.  Administrative Burden for Sources
Another concern for regulated industries is the extent to which
various instruments add burdens, especially burdens that do not seem
necessary to accomplish the environmental goal.  Firms’ most typical
responsibilities are problem-solving (e.g., information, technologies,
prices, expertise, etc.) and monitoring (auditing and reporting emis-
sions of pollutants).  Unless they expect changes to a regulatory pro-
gram to be particularly efficient compared to other options, polluters
MARKANDYA, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY BENEFITS: MONETARY VALUATION (1989);
CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL, COMPLEX REGULATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ECONOMIST’S
VIEW (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Governing Our Environment, Copen-
hagen, Denmark, November 17-18, 1994) (on file with the authors).
82. See generally Peter Bohm & Clifford S. Russell, Comparative Analysis of Alternative
Policy Instruments, in HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY ECONOMICS (Allen
V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 1985).
83. See Richards, supra note 1, at 257-59.
84. See id. at 268-72.
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may resist taking on such costly, additional activities, such as new
analytical studies, extensive reporting requirements, fees for service,
or certification costs.  Resistance may be particularly strong when
polluters believe the requirements are unrelated to achieving envi-
ronmental goals, add legal costs, or delay production schedules.  On
the other hand, they may be supportive of an alternative which, al-
though adding initial costs, gives the firm greater responsibility for,
and control over, the development and implementation of solutions.
d.  Fairness to Sources
Fairness is usually found “in the eye of the beholder.”  Accord-
ingly, our framework assesses instrument choice from the perspective
of sources that are concerned with how particular instruments might
affect either their choices or their competitive position, vis-à-vis other
similar firms.85  When trying to choose among environmental policy
instruments, an agency typically confronts the inherent tension be-
tween treating all sources as if they were the same (uniformity of
treatment) and trying to assure that all sources experience the same
outcomes (uniformity of outcomes).  Few policies, if any, can achieve
both results at the same time.
Within an industrial sector, and even within some firms, there are
always important differences in size, age of facilities, location, finan-
cial arrangements, profitability, etc.  These differences ultimately cre-
ate tensions for policy-makers.  For example, under what circum-
stances might it be best to treat small and large firms alike, even
though the small firms might be placed at a competitive disadvan-
tage?  Are there other circumstances in which it might be better to
select a policy that regulates small and large firms very differently in
order to promote a more equal outcome among all the sources?
While uniform national standards could be judged “fair” in the sense
that all actors are treated the same, differences in firm characteris-
tics—such as type of industry, type and volume of production, loca-
tion and age of facilities, and technology performance—may be more
important determinants of the way a firm is affected by a policy and,
thus, how it assesses fairness.
Another dimension of fairness to sources is the extent to which a
policy instrument allows the firm some autonomy in choosing envi-
ronmental strategies for themselves.  While firms may only argue that
85. For a consideration of fairness from the perspective of how instrument choice affects
individuals and communities, see discussion supra Part IV.A.3. on Environmental Equity and
Justice.
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this autonomy gives them the requisite flexibility to achieve least-cost
solutions, the principle of retaining private sector control over inter-
nal decisions regarding process and product related changes is also a
powerful ideological issue in American culture.
Because of these difficulties, it is not common to find govern-
ment policies that can satisfy all of involved interests.  Most ap-
proaches that are satisfactory across the board involve some tradeoffs
between equality of treatment and reaching roughly equal outcomes.86
2.  Demands on Government87
One of the most persistent complaints about current approaches
to environmental protection is that they require too much involve-
ment by government agencies, which costs taxpayers money and often
delays companies in their attempts to improve their environmental
performance.  Rather than simply setting the targets and stepping
back so that firms can choose the best strategies for meeting the tar-
gets, government agencies spend too much time and too many re-
sources deciding what each type of source must do, and then concen-
trate on enforcing rather than facilitating compliance.  According to
this view, instruments that use incentives to reward improved envi-
ronmental performance or rely on voluntary efforts by companies
would be much cheaper for government to develop and administer.
Although much of this criticism is directed at federal agencies,
especially EPA, a majority of the oversight, implementation, and en-
forcement of federally mandated environmental regulations takes
place at the state level.  Moreover, states have, in many areas, the dis-
cretionary authority to go beyond federal requirements.  Thus, in
comparing how effective the instruments might be at minimizing the
demands placed on government, both federal and state governments
must be considered.
a. Costs
Governmental agencies expend considerable resources in the
86. See generally ALAN P. LOEB, REGULATORY REFORM IN THE REAGAN ERA AND THE
ADOLESCENCE OF MARKET-BASED INNOVATION (unpublished paper presented to the Envi-
ronmental Law Society, The Law School at the University of Chicago, May 20, 1993) (on file
with the authors).
87. Parts of this section are based on McGarity, supra note 41, and on SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO,
RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND ADAPTABILITY TO
CHANGE (unpublished contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,
Aug. 1994) (on file with the authors).
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course of formulating and implementing environment protection pro-
grams.  The federal government spends more on environmental pro-
tection than the states.  Yet over the past fifteen years, EPA’s budget
has decreased, while many of the states have held their expenditures
on environmental protection at a constant level, and in some areas
have actually increased expenditures.88  In 1992, the federal and state
governments spent an estimated $1.8 billion in current dollars on
regulation and monitoring activities—or two percent of the estimated
total expenditures on pollution abatement and control in the United
States.89
Even though this is a relatively small proportion of overall ex-
penditures, differences in instruments’ requirements for analytical
support, rulemaking, on-going administration and implementation,
monitoring, and compliance activities suggest opportunities for re-
ducing or reallocating expenditures.  For example, information-
gathering costs to government when attempting to gain expert knowl-
edge of a particular industrial sector can be very high; in some in-
stances, these costs may restrict the government’s ability to know
what it should do in order to regulate effectively.  In addition, instru-
ments, which must be established through the rulemaking process,
extract additional resources from the agency in the form of time spent
on preparation of supporting documentation.  For example, the com-
plete rule-making process to establish a major rule may require the
production of tens of thousands of pages of documentation, including
responses from industry and other stakeholders.  Even the amend-
ment process, when trying to change mistakes in these rules, can be a
formidable undertaking.
In addition, multiple levels of government may also be involved
in administering and enforcing the instrument.  Some instruments
may require a level of monitoring and enforcement by the state that is
expensive for the agency in terms of personnel and documentation.
Problems—such as variability of processes, equipment malfunctions,
and operator errors, etc.—may compound the cost of monitoring for
some instruments.  For other instruments, front-end implementation
may be relatively simple and straightforward but, once in place, may
require more extensive enforcement efforts.
88. See EVAN J. RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE STATE LEVEL
(Sharpe, 1993).
89. See Gary L. Rutledge & Christine R. Vogan, Pollution Abatement and Control Expen-
ditures, 1972-92, 74 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUS. 36 (May 1994).
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b.  Ease of Analysis
Ease of analysis concerns the degree of analytical complexity an
instrument poses for the regulatory agency in translating Congres-
sional goals into actions that polluters can understand and implement.
When Congress establishes risk goals, the task of determining the
level of exposure that poses an acceptable risk to human health or the
environment is usually left to the implementing agency.  Congress
most often states acceptable risk in general terms.90  Occasionally,
however, risk definitions have been quite specific.91  Similarly, when
Congress enacts an abatement goal, usually stated in terms of “best
efforts” for reducing pollution, the agency must identify those tech-
nologies that will satisfy the Congressional language.92
Instruments used with a risk strategy may require more analytical
work and be more controversial because of the scientific uncertainty
involved and the need to continually update goals once they are put
in place.  Instruments that are used with abatement strategies may
also be resource intensive, but once in place, require less continuous
revision.
Regardless of whether Congress chooses a risk or abatement
goal, or a mix of the two, EPA must usually complete a range of
analyses to characterize the problem posed by the particular process
or product, and examine alternative ways to handle that problem.  It
must also document its analyses in sufficient detail to withstand the
rulemaking process and other challenges that may be raised in the
implementation phase.  Analyses might include scientific studies to
establish pollutant pathways, engineering studies that document the
90. Examples of this type of statutory goal include setting National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) at a level that protects the public health with an “adequate margin of
safety,” see 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1); setting standards under the CWA that will protect the public
health and welfare with an ample margin of safety,” see 33 U.S.C. § 307(a)(4); prohibition in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) on the disposal of untreated hazardous
wastes in land disposal facilities as long as the wastes remain hazardous, unless EPA approves a
method that will be “protective of human health and the environment,” see 42 U.S.C. §
6924(g)(5) (emphasis added).
91. See generally FIFRA, 7 U.S.C.A. § 136; Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986, 42 USC § 11001 (1994).
92. For example, the CWA requires sources of listed toxic water pollutants to meet effluent
limitations based upon the “best available technology economically achievable,” Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C.(b)(2)(A); the CWA and CAA provide for standards reflecting best efforts for
new sources of pollution, CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (“best available demonstrated control
technology”), CAA , 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (best adequately demonstrated control technology);
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments require EPA to promulgate standards for new and exist-
ing sources of listed hazardous air pollutants reflecting the maximum degree of reduction achiev-
able,  42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).
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best technological designs, cost-benefit analysis of the potential regu-
latory impact, and cost-benefit analyses of post-implementation im-
pacts.  The uncertainty and/or difficulty of interpreting the techno-
logical, economic, scientific, and socio-political data can be daunting
to regulators.  At a minimum, analytical complexity can prolong the
period required for translation, provide opportunities for challenges
to the agency’s efforts, and increase the opportunities for errors in
translation.
The credibility and certainty of the supporting analytical work
and documentation, the level of institutional resources committed to
implementation, resistance by regulated entities or the public, and the
opportunities for administrative, congressional, and judicial review,
are all factors with the potential to affect whether or not a particular
instrument is implemented in a successful and timely manner.
C.  Change
Almost all parties involved in environmental issues express a de-
sire to improve their capacity to encourage and take advantage of
new technological capabilities that can improve environmental pro-
tection.  Yet, both industry and government often express frustration
at the complexity and lack of responsiveness that characterize the de-
cision-making processes.
Sometimes, proceeding slowly may be what Congress intended.
For example, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Congres-
sional “waitover” period, and the mandate for risk assessment all en-
courage deliberation before action to protect the rights of those af-
fected by government actions.93  And when choosing instruments to
implement policies, decision-makers have often bet on “a sure thing,”
even though it may restrict opportunities to learn about new tech-
nologies or to respond to new information about environmental risks.
However, in a world dominated by increasing complexity and
uncertainty, there are many advocates for making environmental
policy both easier to implement and more responsive to change—two
criteria that capture the nation’s interest in creating a future-oriented
policy framework to encourage and accommodate change.94
93. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)-(e) (1994); see also Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1997); Marc Landy & Kyle D. Dell, The
Failure of Risk Reform Legislation in the 104th Congress, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 113,
115-119 (1998).
94. See, e.g., Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex
Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167 (1996)
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1.  Adaptability95
A key criticism of current approaches for protecting the envi-
ronment is that they are not very adaptable to important and rapid
changes in scientific understanding or technological capabilities.96
According to this view, the only sensible way to address the uncer-
tainty associated with complex environmental policy issues is to use
instruments which give government agencies and polluters the needed
flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances and to learn from ex-
perimental efforts.
Critics believe the policy instruments we typically use unneces-
sarily restrict options for effective solutions.  Companies express frus-
tration, for example, at their inability to make even minor product or
process changes to improve performance and maintain competitive-
ness without seeking administrative approval—no matter how slight
or temporary—for variations from environmental requirements.
Government officials are similarly frustrated when innovative policies
they wish to support are blocked by statutory restrictions or objec-
tions from special interest groups.
However, when tradeoffs between adaptability to change and
other public values do emerge, policy-makers may sometimes give
adaptability the back seat.  For example, they may decide that they
are more interested in assuring a high level of protection from haz-
ardous waste storage and in providing opportunities for full public
participation in siting decisions than in using an approach which
might be easily adapted to changing information.
Once the level of protection is in place, federal and state agencies
have often been reluctant to re-evaluate such a decision because of
the institutional difficulties of modification.  In addition, some com-
panies may prefer a high degree of certainty over adaptability in
situations where a rule or regulation protects their investments or en-
hances their competitiveness.  However, if policy-makers agree that
the capacity to accommodate change is desirable, then basing the
choice of policy instruments on a strategy that is either not likely to
(discussing the implications of complexity theory for environmental policy).
95. Parts of this section are based on SHAPIRO, supra note 87.
96. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994); Alyson C. Flournoy, Coping with Complexity, 27 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 809 (1994); Ronald H. Rosenberg, Evolving Consensus: The Dynamic Future of Environ-
mental Law and Policy, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1049 (1994).
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require modifications or is relatively easy to modify makes the most
sense.
This section evaluates the difficulty, or “marginal grief,” for gov-
ernment to modify a particular instrument.  It also assesses the extent
to which a targeted entity has some autonomy and is able to adapt its
responses to changes that impact its environmental performance
without waiting for approval from a regulatory agency.
The two major sources of change which trigger a need to modify
policy instruments are a change in the perception of risk from a pol-
lutant or activity, or a change in abatement capability.  A change in
risk perception typically comes from new scientific information or
changing interpretations of existing information.  Both can affect the
assumptions of an underlying risk assessment or cost-benefit analysis
by demonstrating that a pollutant poses a greater or lesser risk than
was previously understood.  A revised risk assessment might suggest
that a different level of risk is socially appropriate.97
Pollution abatement innovations can affect environmental regu-
lations by producing techniques that are less expensive to install
and/or utilize than existing technologies, or that are capable of greater
pollution abatement.  Ideally, technologies offering lower costs or im-
proved capacity could be readily adopted by firms without agency in-
tervention if the changes would improve their overall performance.
Since both types of change are inevitable, all policy instruments
would ideally be either unaffected or easily adaptable.  However, the
potential administrative and political constraints involved in revising
a regulatory decision may make it difficult for policy-makers to
achieve such adaptability in every circumstance.  Nonetheless, if
adaptability to change is a priority, policy-makers can strategically
choose and use instruments to improve their overall performance in
achieving this criterion.
The simplest way to ensure adaptability is to use a strategy and
instrument combination that remains, as much as possible, unaffected
by such change.  For example, since harm-based standards are tied to
risk, polluters have complete flexibility to respond to favorable
97. For example, new information on risk pathways indicating greater risks from pollutants
than previously understood might trigger reevaluation of acceptable risk levels.  Also, the pub-
lic’s willingness to accept risks from a particular activity might change even though scientific
knowledge about such risks has not changed.  For example, such knowledge may simply become
more widespread or the public may perceive the benefits from the activity as diminishing or
becoming less important relative to perceived risks.
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changes in cost, availability, or new capability in abatement technolo-
gies, without waiting for a revised standard.
Similarly, when one’s perception of risk changes, one may not
need to modify technology-based standards, such as design standards,
especially if no significant changes in the performance of technologies
have occurred.  If one assumes that, given the current state of tech-
nology, over-control is not likely to be a problem in the near future,
then sidestepping the need to justify a risk-based standard for each
pollutant has advantages.
Nevertheless, sometimes change makes modification of the in-
strument itself desirable.  The ease of such change depends more on
the required decision-making procedures—in particular those associ-
ated with administrative decision-making and congressional and judi-
cial review requirements—than on any inherent characteristics of the
instrument.  These complex procedures usually apply to instruments
that require sources to take specific pollution reduction actions.
Thus, there is often a tradeoff between improving performance of
adaptability to change and maintaining assurance of meeting envi-
ronmental goals.
a.  Ease of Program Modification
Policy instruments vary in the degree of difficulty the regulatory
agency has in completing the steps required for their modification.
Some believe that even the most inherently adaptable of instruments
is likely to become difficult to modify once it is embedded in the cur-
rent institutional configuration of agencies and decision-making proc-
esses for environmental policy-making.98
EPA is required both by statutes and Executive Orders to evalu-
ate risks to health and the environment and to consider the feasibility
of alternative solutions for reducing those risks.99  When EPA modi-
fies an instrument, it must identify and resolve the scientific, engi-
neering, and legal issues that the changes have raised.  Because EPA
employs a relatively small number of scientists, engineers, and
economists capable of undertaking rigorous scientific and policy
analyses, the number of difficult projects that the agency can under-
take at any given point in time is limited.
98. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (May 1985).
99. See Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7408; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136d; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC § 2605(d).
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While providing important guarantees of due process to sources
and agency accountability to the public, the legal and procedural re-
quirements of the APA can nonetheless restrict EPA’s ability to re-
spond to changes in a timely manner.  In addition, instruments for
which a large number of waivers must be individually handled can
also be resource intensive.
b.  Ease of Source Changes
For many firms, the ability to make product or process changes
quickly can be essential for competitiveness.  Having to wait for deci-
sions by administrative agencies regarding permit modifications or
waivers can be frustrating, especially when the facility managers be-
lieve the impact on environmental performance will be nonexistent or
negligible.
Continuous, incremental innovations are often the life-blood of
companies in highly competitive industries.  Giving these industries
the flexibility to adapt how they meet goals without having to seek
pre-approvals from an agency official before acting on process or
product modifications could spur technological innovation and in-
crease opportunities to use the most cost-effective solutions.
2.  Technology Innovation and Diffusion100
Technology innovation101 and diffusion102 can be a major source of
economic growth and a cleaner environment.  From an environmental
perspective, innovation and diffusion offer ways to deliver goods and
services with less environmental pollution, and provide new ways to
trap or clean up pollutants.
Concern persists, however, that environmental regulations may
hurt the competitive position of U.S. firms in the global economy by
increasing production costs and impeding performance and cost inno-
vations.103  Examples of these concerns include that: 1) regulation-
100. Parts of this section are based on GEORGE R. HEATON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
INSTRUMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION (1994) (unpublished contractor report pre-
pared for the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress) (on file with the authors).
101. Technology innovation is the first commercial application of a technical idea or
method.  Innovations can be classified as radical or incremental improvements, depending on
the degree of change from the status quo.  Although radical or new innovations often receive
the most attention, the majority of innovations involve small improvements to existing tech-
nologies.
102. Technology diffusion is the adoption of an existing technology by others.
103. Some critics note that these estimates often fail to incorporate that environmental pol-
icy 1) may stimulate economic growth by creating new markets in some sectors, and 2) may
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driven costs place U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage; 2) com-
pliance costs divert money from commercial innovation; and 3) rigid
regulations are incompatible with the trial-and-error processes essen-
tial for economic success in many technology sectors.104
Criticisms directed at specific policy instruments include that: 1)
technology-based instruments favor known technologies; 2) permits
create barriers to innovative improvements; and 3) end-of-pipe, me-
dia-specific standards restrict innovative process solutions.  The cate-
gories we use to evaluate instruments each offer opportunities for fur-
thering technological solutions to environmental problems.  Empha-
sizing one path however, can sometimes constrain opportunities for
utilizing another.
a.  Innovation in the Regulated Industries
Environmental regulations can have both direct and indirect im-
pacts on manufacturing firms or governmental entities, like sewage
treatments plants, for example, by creating preferences for a type of
technology, generating new markets, raising the costs of production,
or diverting capital from other investments and businesses.  Whether
individual firms  innovate is based on many complex factors, both in-
ternal and external to that firm.  Especially for large complex facili-
ties, incremental innovations may offer a relatively low risk route to
profitability.105  But, for smaller firms, diffusion may be a better strat-
egy.
b.  Innovation in the Environmental Goods and Services Industry
The environmental goods and services (EG&S) industry is com-
prised of firms whose primary business is the supply of environmental
equipment and services that control, treat, cleanup, and/or prevent
pollution and waste.106  Government regulation has created and sus-
tained most of the markets for the EG&S industry.  Thus, any
prevent decreasing productivity in sectors dependent on a healthy environment, such as agricul-
ture or fisheries.
104. See generally Steven J. Kline & Don E. Kash, Government Technology Policy: What
Should It Do? 22 THE BRIDGE 12 (Spring 1992); Roy Rothwell, Industrial Innovation and Gov-
ernment Environmental Regulation: Some Lessons from the Past, TECHNOVATION 12(7): 447-
457 (1992); OTA-ITE-586, supra note 74.
105. See generally DON E. KASH, PERPETUAL INNOVATION: THE NEW WORLD OF
COMPETITION (1989); Kline & Kash, supra note 104; NATHAN ROSENBERG, THE ECONOMICS
OF TECHNICAL CHANGE (1971).
106. See OTA-ITE-586, supra note 74, at 2.
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changes in the way regulations are written may affect the health of
the industry.
c.  Diffusion of Known Technologies
Technology diffusion is the common follow-on to successful in-
novations.  Diffusion occurs because firms find technologies benefi-
cial and often essential to their competitiveness.  Subsequent produc-
ers or users of an innovation may modify the technology or the con-
text into which it will fit in order to gain some competitive advantage.
Such adaptations are an important part of the process of technologi-
cal change, and they commonly provide known solutions, or “best
practices,” to firms that do not have the resources for in-house inno-
vation.  Some instruments that promote technology diffusion, how-
ever, may delay or impede a firm’s search for innovations.
Diffusion may be an ideal strategy when technological solutions
for environmental problems are available, but are not widely known
or have not been widely adopted.  This is especially true for small to
medium-sized firms that find the costs of information-searching, and
research and development prohibitive.  For these companies, diffu-
sion may provide a way to reduce costs, and at the same time, achieve
state-of-the-art abatement practices.
When trying to understand how policy tools impact technology
innovation and diffusion, we face at least three basic challenges:
1) technology innovation tries to do what no one yet knows how to
do;107 2) policy impacts occur within complex and unique institutional
arrangements;108 and 3) little research is available on the effects of
specific regulatory instruments on technology innovation.
We do know that establishing regulations in a way that provides
reasonably certain targets and clear timetables reduces uncertainty,
making investments in innovation less risky.  Further, if innovation is
a key purpose, targets and timetables must also put the kind of finan-
cial or technological pressure on companies that will stimulate a
search for new ways of meeting environmental goals.
107. See generally Steven J. Kline, A Numerical Index for the Complexity of Systems: The
Concept and Some Implications, in MANAGING COMPLEXITY AND MODELING REALITY—
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (ACM Press, 1991).
108. See generally CHALMERS A. JOHNSON, JAPAN, WHO GOVERNS?: THE RISE OF THE
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (1995); Kline, Styles of Innovation, supra note 74; DANIEL I.
OKIMOTO, BETWEEN MITI AND THE MARKET: JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR HIGH
TECHNOLOGY (1989).
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While environmental regulations can be important, they are, in
most cases, a relatively small factor among many that firms consider
when choosing to innovate.109  This suggests that if technology innova-
tion is a high priority, there may be many more direct and effective
ways to encourage it than reforming the particular regulatory instru-
ments used to implement environmental goals.  In the case of tech-
nology diffusion, effective regulations may reduce incentives for com-
panies to innovate.110
V.  COMPARING TOOLS: DESIGN STANDARDS AND
TRADEABLE EMISSIONS
In this section, we explore how design standards and tradeable
emissions compare when looking at four of the criteria discussed
above—assurance of meeting goals, environmental equity and justice,
cost effectiveness and fairness to sources, and technology innovation
and diffusion.  A summary of how each instrument option both pro-
motes and impairs these four, as well as three additional, criteria is
included in Boxes 1 and 2.
BOX 1: DEBATES ABOUT DESIGN STANDARDS
Assurance of Meeting Goals
Promotes criteria:
• Design standards establish a less complex regulatory system than multi-source tools, and so
are more likely to work as desired.
• Design standards allow an agency to determine compliance by monitoring whether the model
technology is used, rather than monitoring emissions directly.
Impairs criteria:
• Pollution control levels achievable by identified model technologies may not be stringent
enough to achieve environmental goals.
• Design standards do not address cumulative effects of discharges from multiple sources.
Pollution Prevention
Promotes criterion:
• Design standards can create a preference for pollution prevention, if desired.
Impairs criterion:
• Design standards can inhibit pollution prevention efforts, if the agency picks an end-of-the-
pipe technology as its model technology.
109. See OTA-ITE-586, supra note 74, at 81-87.
110. However, a company could always choose to innovate for performance or cost reasons
related to productivity.
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Environmental Equity and Justice
Promotes criterion:
• Design standards offer communities input into the standard-setting process.
Impairs criterion:
• Design standards do not effectively address problems of “hot spots,” or differential impacts on
communities.
Cost-Effectiveness and Fairness to Sources
Promotes criteria:
• Entities are free to propose an equivalent, more cost-effective pollution control approach.
• Design standards are fair because they impose similar requirements on similar facilities, re-
gardless of location.
Impairs criteria:
• Design standards are not cost effective because they do not consider differences in cost across
facilities.
• Design standards can be unfair because they often impose different requirements among in-
dustrial sectors.
Demands on Government
Promotes criterion:
• Analytical requirements for setting design standards are less demanding than harm-based
standards.
Impairs criterion:
• Design standards still require substantial analytical and data resources, although relatively less
than harm-based standards.
Adaptability
Promotes criterion:
• Entities are free to propose a new technology, if equivalent or superior to the model control
technology.
Impairs criteria:
• If an agency adopts a new technology as the model technology, it must recalculate the corre-
sponding emission limitations.
• Design standards are subject to time-consuming public notice-and-comment procedures re-
quired under the Administrative Procedures Act.
Technology Innovation and Diffusion
Promotes criteria:
• Design standards encourage suppliers of pollution control equipment to innovate, because the
new technology might become the “model” technology and have an immediate market.
• Design standards promote diffusion of the “model” technology.
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Impairs criteria:
• Regulated entities may use the existing model technology instead of innovating because of the
expense of proving a new approach is “equivalent.”
• Regulated entities may feel disinclined to develop more effective control technology because
of the danger that it could cause tighter emission limitations.
BOX 2: DEBATES ABOUT EMISSIONS TRADING
Assurance of Meeting Goals
Promotes Criterion:
• Trading can bring otherwise unregulated sources under control.
Impairs Criteria:
• Trading can result in “hot spots.”
• Noncompliance is hard to detect because of inter-firm pollutant movement, unless monitoring
is improved.
Pollution Prevention
Promotes Criterion:
• Trading can leave sources free to choose between control equipment or process changes for
emission reductions.
Impairs Criterion:
• Trading tends to focus on reductions in releases more than on reductions in pollution gener-
ated.
Environmental Equity and Justice
Promotes Criterion:
• “Dirty” sources, which are often in poor/minority neighborhoods, are likely to find control
cheaper than purchasing permits, since their incremental control costs may be lower than
cleaner sources.
Impairs Criteria:
• Trading distributes emissions according to market forces, not by an open administrative proc-
ess that allows community input.
• Trading might perpetuate the existing inequitable pollution distribution.
Cost-Effectiveness and Fairness to Sources
Promotes Criteria:
• Trading provides incentives for regulated entities to identify cheaper ways to control emissions
beyond their own “target.”
FRIEDMAN_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  10:54 AM
Spring 2000] THE CHALLENGE OF COMPETING GOALS 371
• Large cost savings might result from even limited use of trading, if entities with the worst ratio
of cost to environmental benefit participate.
Impairs Criteria:
• Estimated cost savings assume a heavy volume of trading, which has not occurred in practice.
• “Grandfathering” as an initial permit allocation method can result in an inequitable distribu-
tion.
Demands on Government
Promotes Criterion:
• Trading reduces the need for government to identify control technologies.
Impairs Criterion:
• Agencies implementing trading have found increased workloads in the early stages of imple-
mentation.
Adaptability
Promotes Criteria:
• Trading allows entities to adopt a new technology, so long as it meets emission requirements.
• Agencies can change aggregate emissions by not reissuing expired permits or by issuing addi-
tional permits.
Impairs Criterion:
• Property rights raise questions about government’s ability to adapt the number of permits to
changing circumstances.
Technology Innovation and Diffusion
Promotes Criterion:
• Trading fosters innovation, because a potential to reduce emissions below any individual
source’s allocation has market value.
Impairs Criterion:
• Some economic models show trading is neutral or discourages innovation, because entities
holding tradeable credits might not want their value diffused by new cheaper control tech-
nologies.
A.  Assurance of Meeting Goals
Assurance of meeting the environmental goal may be the bot-
tom-line criterion for many policy-makers and stakeholders, espe-
cially when the environmental problem poses serious risks to human
health.  Debates about policy tool selection typically focus on asking,
“will it do the job?”  The answer to that question, however, is not al-
ways clear.  Both design standards and tradeable emissions offer sig-
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nificant assurances—but no guarantees—that the environmental goal
will be met.  Each tool poses different challenges.
Design standards require a specified level of pollution control
from each individual regulated entity.  As such, design standards help
ensure that pollution reduction goals are met but cannot guarantee
that environmental quality goals will be met.  Design standards are
very commonly used and have been found to be less analytically com-
plex and data intensive than other tools, such as harm-based stan-
dards.  As a result, they have typically been implemented at a faster
rate.  Their relative ease of implementation means that some level of
control will be put in place faster than under other tools.  Similarly,
some authors have argued that this form of regulatory system is less
complicated and therefore has a greater chance of success than cer-
tain of the market-based approaches.111
Proponents of emissions trading also stress the tool’s ability to
achieve environmental goals and argue that, in some circumstances,
trading may be the only method suitable for achieving those goals.
Where remaining contamination problems stem largely from unregu-
lated sources, trading offers an incentive for a regulated source to ac-
cept responsibility for controlling these sources in exchange for emis-
sions control credit at its own facility.  Also, many trading programs
require a greater than 1:1 ratio between emission reductions and
emission increases.112  While such trading ratios are typically adopted
as a safety margin for environmental quality, potentially compensat-
ing for imperfect models and other uncertainties, such ratios could
potentially have the effect of reducing emissions.
Experience with trading programs indicates that trading may im-
prove an agency’s ability to determine compliance and environmental
progress because requirements for increased monitoring have often
been coupled with a trading program.  However, it is important to
note that the policy decision to require increased monitoring is inde-
pendent of trading as a regulatory instrument.
Both design standards and tradeable emissions have their critics,
however.  For example, design standards only indirectly assure at-
tainment of a risk-based goal.  In places that do not currently meet
environmental goals, design standards move things in the right direc-
tion by ensuring that those polluters that have not yet installed the
111. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and ‘Fine-Tuning’ Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985).
112. See, e.g., Policy Statement, supra note 32; WATERSHED-BASED TRADING, supra note
31.
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required level of technology do so or adopt an alternative strategy
that meets required emission limitations.  This general movement,
however, will not necessarily ensure that a risk goal is achieved.  First,
existing technologies may not be capable of reducing discharges from
a single source to the level necessary to achieve pollutant concentra-
tions in the receiving media that meet the risk goals.  Second, even if
a single plant’s compliance with a design standard achieves the goal,
the design standard approach does not prevent neighboring sources
from discharging the same pollutant.  The cumulative effect of dis-
charges from two or more facilities, all of which meet prescribed de-
sign standards, can be a concentration of pollutants that violates the
risk-based goal.  This characteristic weakness of a design standard is
often alleviated by combining the design standard with a harm-based
standard that takes effect if the design standard fails to attain the
goal.
Emissions trading can be similarly controversial with regard to
certainty.  One of the most hotly debated issues about emissions
trading is whether the approach will achieve environmental goals.  In
theory, an emissions trading program should achieve environmental
goals, because the program places a cap on the total amount of per-
mitted emissions, with the cap consistent with the goal.  In practice,
the environmental effects of trading are more complicated.  The
variation in emission rates from facility to facility can be quite large.
Hence, trading programs are often judged as unacceptable for toxic
pollutants where high local concentrations would be a concern.
In addition, trading programs may retain emissions that would
otherwise be eliminated.  For example, under some emissions trading
programs, a firm that is closing a facility may sell its emissions rather
than retire the emissions reduction and create a benefit to the envi-
ronment.  With trading, individual entities are not required to control
pollution to the best of their abilities.113  Moreover, compliance re-
sponsibilities of individual facilities may be more difficult to deter-
mine if a central register of emissions permits and trading is not care-
fully designed.  Trading increases the complexity of emissions moni-
toring because inter-facility emission exchanges are also allowed.114
To provide adequate assurance that environmental goals are being
met, agencies must have adequate monitoring capability to track
compliance with a trading program’s multisource limits.
113. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o; Policy Statement, supra note 32.
114. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a).
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In summary, both design standards and tradeable emissions offer
a reasonable degree of assurance that an environmental goal will be
met, although for different reasons.  Decision-makers who prefer
well-understood and familiar approaches are likely to find design
standards more attractive than tradeable emissions.  Decision-makers
may consider tradeable emissions desirable when faced with envi-
ronmental contamination that regulatory approaches have been un-
able to reach because of the potential for encouraging non-regulated
sources to “opt-in” to environmental control requirements.  Neither
design standards nor tradeable emissions directly address the issue of
aggregated environmental impacts from multiple emissions sources
that are located geographically close together.
B.  Environmental Equity and Justice.
Environmental equity and justice addresses the issue of whether
specific groups may bear a disproportionate burden of environmental
risks, especially adverse impacts from discriminatory siting of facilities
and from the implementation of environmental laws.  Design stan-
dards and tradeable emissions can address some of the distributional
effects of pollution, but both also have the potential to result in “hot
spots.”
Design standards typically set minimum pollution control re-
quirements at levels that are the same for all facilities in an industrial
category, regardless of where in the country they are located.  Such
minimum control requirements can help ensure that all communities
receive some environmental protection.  However, design standards
do not address the problem of concentrated sources, which can lead
to aggregated emissions at unhealthy and environmentally unsound
levels.  Data indicate that source concentration occurs more fre-
quently in minority and low-income communities.115  In these circum-
stances, a decision-maker may need to turn to other tools as an alter-
native to, or in combination with, design standards to adequately pro-
tect the community.
Little analysis has been undertaken regarding the effect of emis-
sions trading on environmental equity and justice.  Several public in-
terest groups are concerned that emissions trading may result in an
inequitable distribution of health risks and environmental contamina-
tion.  These groups argue that the dirtiest companies, which tend to
be located in poor and minority communities, will find it cheaper to
115. See sources cited supra note 53.
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purchase credits allowing them to maintain emission levels rather
than to make the investment in emission reductions.  However, trad-
ing might result in exactly the opposite result; dirty sources in poor
and minority neighborhoods would find emissions control cheaper
than purchasing permits since their incremental control costs may be
cheaper than cleaner sources.  Economic theory suggests that dirty
facilities would be net sellers, although no evaluative data are avail-
able to indicate whether this actually occurs.
Careful implementation of tradeable emissions may be necessary
to avoid “hot spots” of pollution.  Some emissions trading programs
attempt to address the problem of geographic inequities by requiring
agency pre-approval of all trades and conditioning approval on a
finding that the trade will not adversely impact local air quality.116
C.  Cost-Effectiveness and Fairness to Sources
One of the most consistent criticisms of environmental regula-
tions in the United States has been that they often require sources to
adopt inefficient pollution control approaches and thus fail to attain
environmental goals in the least costly fashion.  Tradeable emissions
are a policy tool often applauded for flexibility and potential to
achieve pollution control in a cost-effective way.  Design standards
also offer some flexibility in choosing the specific technology used to
meet an emissions control requirement.  However, design standards
focus on individual sources and tend to aim emitters towards a
“model” control technology.  As a result, decision-makers who are
particularly concerned about cost-effectiveness and fairness to emit-
ters may find tradeable emissions more attractive than design stan-
dards.
Design standards are typically based on a model technology but
are expressed as emissions limits.  Firms, therefore, have some flexi-
bility to lower the costs of complying with an emissions limit by se-
lecting the cheaper of either the model technology or an “equivalent”
technology.  In addition, the original purpose of design standards was
to require regulated entities to improve their pollution reduction
technologies continuously, with “best available” technology becoming
better—in terms of performance and cost—over time.  In reality, de-
sign standards have not given facilities an incentive to search for
cheaper compliance techniques once they have complied with the
116. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 112.
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emissions limit,117 and these standards will not do so unless advances
providing much improved performance or cheaper costs become
available.
Design standards establish minimum levels of pollution control
for categories and subcategories of sources.  To the extent sources are
treated alike and required to meet the same minimum control levels,
this tool could be characterized as fair.  Note, though, that firms may
have to face different costs to achieve the same design standard, de-
pending on factors such as a facility’s design and current pollution
levels.
Emissions trading is often described as the tool used to achieve a
given level of emissions control at the lowest cost.  In theory, regu-
lated entities should continue trading emissions permits until their
incremental costs of controlling pollution are the same; this would
result in the lowest possible level of aggregate control costs.  The
magnitude of predicted savings depends on program design, treat-
ment cost differentials across sources, the number of sources, the
cost-effectiveness of the base case to which trading is compared, and
other factors.
In practice, trading programs probably have not achieved all the
cost savings that theory would predict.  Most estimates of cost savings
presume active trading until the economically efficient distribution of
emissions control responsibilities is achieved.  However, it appears
that no program has yet reached that level of trading, that many have
had only limited trading, and that some have had no trades at all.
Thus, savings estimates generally should be considered the likely up-
per bound of control cost savings from a particular trading program.
However, it should be noted that even limited participation in a
trading program might achieve a significant percentage of estimated
cost savings if the program allows extreme results to be avoided.  For
example, trading might allow firms with very high relative incre-
mental costs of control to meet emission requirements by the less ex-
pensive means of trading, rather than spending large sums to meet a
uniform requirement with very little pollution reduced per dollar ex-
pended.  In effect, much of the cost savings from trading might come
from preventing very unwise actions rather than promoting clever,
economically efficient actions.
117. See generally Dennis A. Yao, Strategic Responses to Automobile Emissions Control: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis, 15 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 419 (1988).
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The fairness of emissions trading programs has received some-
what less discussion than their cost effects.  Whether a trading pro-
gram treats regulated entities fairly depends on such issues as initial
allocation of emission credits, relative control costs imposed on dif-
ferent entities, and the rate of emissions reduction required for each
entity.
The initial allocation of pollution control responsibilities will in
large part determine whether emissions trading programs result in an
equitable distribution among regulated entities.  Trading will reallo-
cate emissions among buyers and sellers, but the means of initial dis-
tribution must be decided by Congress or the regulating agency.  The
difficulty arises from the fact that large amounts of money are poten-
tially at stake.  The most commonly used initial allocation approach is
a type of “grandfathering,” in which tradeable emission permits are
distributed according to some aspect of historical operations or emis-
sions.  For example, Congress based the allocations of acid rain al-
lowances on historical fuel use and sulfur content.118  The South Coast
Air Quality Management District allocated emission credits in the
Los Angeles area based on “historic use” of each piece of NOx- and
SO2-emitting equipment at a facility and then subtracted the emission
reductions necessary to comply with adopted rules.  Grandfathering
has the advantage of causing the least disruption to the status quo.
Yet this approach might also be somewhat inequitable, as new en-
trants to the emissions market will have to pay for permits while
grandfathered firms obtain them for free.  Other approaches to the
initial distribution of emission allocations are possible but have yet to
be tried.
In summary, decision-makers who are primarily interested in
achieving environmental goals in a fair and cost-effective manner ap-
pear likely to consider the adoption of tradeable emissions more fre-
quently than design standards.
D.  Technology Innovation and Diffusion
Technology innovation and diffusion can be a major source of
both economic growth and a cleaner environment.  Decision-makers
may seek a policy tool that encourages such innovation.  While both
design standards and tradeable emissions can create significant incen-
tives for new technologies, many believe that a tradeable emissions
118. See COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. CONGRESS, CLEAN
AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, H. Rpt. 101-952 (1990).
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program has greater potential to encourage technology innovation
and diffusion.
One of the original goals for design standards was to spur contin-
ual innovation by revising regulations as the state-of-the-art of tech-
nologies improved.119  Some statutory language incorporating design
standards—such as “best available technology”120—reflects an as-
sumption that regulated facilities and suppliers of pollution control
equipment would continue to innovate over time.  In effect, the
“best” would become better and the “lowest” would get lower still.
In practice, however, this desired link between design standards and
continuous innovation has seldom materialized.  For example, Clean
Water Act standards considered to be technology-forcing over a 5- to
10-year timeframe were met by industry on time using existing tech-
nologies.121
The common use of a “model” technology for design standards
can sometimes be viewed as a “de facto” technology specification,
which thereby impedes incentives for innovation.  Since most envi-
ronmental laws do not require a source to achieve pollution control
beyond what the regulatory agency finds can be done with existing
technologies, innovation is not necessary to satisfy many design stan-
dards.  However, if the model technology would be very expensive for
a source to adopt, there might be an incentive to find a more cost-
effective “equivalent” technology.  In practice, many firms report that
the effort to establish an alternative’s equivalency is often difficult or
risky.  This is especially true when the model technology has been
written into a source’s permit so that pre-approval of a change, rather
than a demonstration of equivalent performance after installation, is
required.  Moreover, the conventional wisdom has been that, contrary
to original expectations, firms have not been inclined to develop new
technologies because of concerns that a new technology would result
in more stringent emissions control requirements the next time an
agency updates the design standard.122
119. See generally Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation
and Technology Innovation, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 161
(Christopher T. Hill & James M. Utterback eds., 1979).
120. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
121. Telephone Interview (by Elizabeth Gunn) with Gladys Meade, American Lung Asso-
ciation (Oct. 7, 1994).
122. See generally Ashford et al., supra note 119; STEVEN LIPMANN, INDUSTRY VIEWS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, (unpublished contractor report prepared for the Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1994) (on file with the authors).
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Design standards specify a clear and uniform emissions limit for
each source category using a model technology.  Uniform limits de-
veloped from identified technology create a clear target for the Envi-
ronmental Goods & Services (EG&S) industry when it is interested in
developing new control technologies.  An EG&S company also has an
incentive to develop cheaper or more effective technologies, in the
hope that the new technology would become the new “model” tech-
nology used when developing the next round of design standards.
EG&S firms can also play a large and effective role in promoting dif-
fusion of the technologies.
One of the most often cited advantages of emissions trading is
that it fosters technological innovation.  Since emission reductions
should be considered the equivalent of valuable and marketable emis-
sion permits, the incentives created by the trading program could
stimulate innovation in the strategies and technologies used to reduce
emissions.  However, no actual data are available about the effects of
tradeable emissions on technology innovation.
In theory, tradeable emissions should promote innovation.  A
significant advantage of a tradeable emissions program is that it al-
lows firms with widely varying marginal costs of abatement control to
cooperate in meeting environmental standards with lower overall
costs.  Facilities with high marginal costs could be expected either to
innovate to reduce pollution, or to purchase emission credits from
other facilities that possess the capability for less expensive reduc-
tions; this also creates incentives for potential sellers to innovate.
Note, however, that several economic models have found weaker
links between trading and innovation than often asserted.123  The de-
gree of innovation will strongly depend on the stringency of the emis-
sions cap faced by the facilities.124  To the extent that tradeable emis-
sions improve the cost effectiveness of control, incentives for innova-
tion are reduced.
The effect of a tradeable emissions regime on the EG&S industry
will depend on the structure of the particular regulated industry.  If
the industry relies heavily on suppliers for compliance technologies or
services, it may have indirect incentives for innovation or increased
opportunities for diffusion of known solutions to more clients.  For
example, if imposed on the automobile or electric power industries,
123. See, e.g., Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation, 43
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (1979); D. A. Malueg, Emission Credit Trading and the Incentive
To Adopt New Pollution Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 52 (1989).
124. See OTA-ITE-586, supra note 74, at 214-216.
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such a regime might create pressure on the suppliers for innovations;
if imposed on the chemicals industry, which relies strongly on in-
house expertise, the EG&S industry would be less affected.
VI.  CHOOSING INSTRUMENTS
Whether Congress prefers to specify the choice of policy tools it-
self or delegate the choice to EPA, states, localities, or even the pri-
vate sector, someone is faced with the difficult problem of matching
tools to problems.  Table 3 summarizes the OTA Report’s judgments
about how well each instrument addresses each of the seven criteria.125
Such a table is probably most helpful to a decision-maker or
stakeholder with strongly held beliefs about the primacy of a single
criterion or clear preferences for a subset of instruments.  For exam-
ple, many decision-makers will agree with Richards’ stated preference
for choosing the least-cost instrument, unless it is not within the “fea-
sible set” due to a legal or political constraints.  He or she can focus
on the series of rows in the table that isolate the various aspects of
“costs and burdens,” such as cost-effectiveness for sources or cost to
government.  Similar to Richards’ evaluation, emissions trading is an
attractive option when costs are the primary criteria.  But information
reporting is attractive too, as long as certainty of achieving a fixed
target is not, in Richards’ parlance, a “political constraint.”126
Others decision-makers may have far different priorities and
choose to focus on assurance of meeting environmental goals or in-
centives for technology innovation.  As can be seen from the table,
different instruments will be preferred.
For most decision-makers, however, the strengths and weak-
nesses of a particular policy tool will depend on the context of a par-
ticular environmental problem.  The importance of assuring that envi-
ronmental goals will be met depends on the level of risk.  Cost effec-
tiveness of control is clearly more of an issue when the cost of lower-
ing emissions is high.
125. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 143-200 (Chapter 4 includes detailed discussions of
how each judgment was reached).
126. See Richards, supra note 1, at 229-30.
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Table 3:  Comparison of the Effectiveness of Policy Instruments
        ToolsWith Fixed Targets
Single-source       Multi-source
Product
bans
Technology Integrated
specifications permitting
Design Tradeable
standards emissions
Harm-based Challenge
standards regulations
Assurance of meeting goals       .
action forcing       
monitoring capability    .  ∇ ∇
Environmental familiarity with use
. ∇   . . ∇
Results Pollution prevention    . . . .
gives prevention an advantage    .  . .
focuses on learning
. ∇ ∇ ∇ . . 
Environmental equity and justice
. . . . . ∇ ∇
distributional outcomes
. . .  . ∇ ∇
effective participation
. . . . . ∇ ∇
remediation
. . . . . . .
Cost effectiveness and fairness ∇ ∇ . .   
cost effective for society ∇ ∇ . . .  
cost effective for sources ∇ ∇ . .   
fairness to sources ∇ ∇ . . .  
Costs and administrative burden to sources
. . . . ∇ ∇ ∇
Burdens Demands on government
. . . ∇ . . 
costs
. . . ∇ . . 
ease of analysis ∇ . . ∇ ∇  
Adaptability ∇ ∇ ∇ . . . 
ease of program modification ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
ease of change for sources ∇ ∇ ∇ .   
Change Technology innovation and diffusion  . . . .  
innovation in regulated industry  ∇ ∇ . .  
innovation in EG&S industry
. ∇  . .  
diffusion of technologies
.   . . . .
= Effective, = It Depends, ∇= Use With Caution, . = Average
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Table 3 (continued):  Comparison of the Effectiveness of Policy Instruments
 Tools Without Fixed Targets
Pollution
charges
Liability
Information
reporting
Subsidies
Technical
assistance
Assurance of meeting goals
. . ∇ ∇ ∇
action forcing
. . ∇ ∇ ∇
monitoring capability ∇ ∇ . . .
Environmental familiarity with use ∇ .   
Results Pollution prevention
.  . . 
gives prevention an advantage
.  .  
focuses on learning
.   . 
Environmental equity and justice ∇ .   
distributional outcomes ∇ . . . .
effective participation ∇ .   
remediation
.  .  
Cost effectiveness and fairness
. .  . 
cost effective for society  .  ∇ .
cost effective for sources
. .   
fairness to sources ∇ ∇ . . .
Costs and administrative burden to sources
. ∇ . . .
Burdens Demands on government
. .  ∇ .
costs
. .  ∇ .
ease of analysis ∇ . . . .
Adaptability
.   . 
ease of program modification ∇    
ease of change for sources    . 
Change Technology innovation and diffusion  . . . .
innovation in regulated industry  . . . .
innovation in EG&S industry  . . . ∇
diffusion of technologies  . .  
= Effective,    = It Depends,    ∇= Use With Caution,    . = Average
The OTA Report presented a two-part framework to help pol-
icy-makers first narrow down the choice of instruments based on how
they perform on each of the seven criteria presented previously, and
then, if needed, to help them buttress weaknesses of any single tool
by using more than one instrument.  A series of key questions about
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the particular problem can provide answers that may point—in com-
bination with the evaluations presented in Table 3—to one set of in-
struments rather than another.  These are summarized in Box 3 (be-
low).
A decision-maker is likely to first ask, “Is there a reason to spec-
ify a fixed environmental target for this pollutant?”  Do the quantities
and location of a pollutant, or the characteristics of its sources, pro-
vide a reason to prefer a fixed control target?  To answer this, one
needs to know how harmful or risky the pollutant is in the quantities
that are being released.  Again, the more serious the problem, the
more heavily one weights “assurance of meeting goals.”  The first
rows in Table 3 display OTA’s judgments of the assurance provided
by each of the instruments.
BOX 3:  KEY QUESTIONS FOR MATCHING POLICY TOOLS TO PROBLEMS
Given the pollutant and the quantities and location of release, is there a reason to specify a fixed
environmental target?  If so, do these targets need to be source specific?
1.)  How harmful or risky is the pollutant in the quantities that are being released?
2.)  Is this problem typically quite localized or regional in nature?
3.)  Does the technology exist to monitor the pollutant at a reasonable cost?
Given the pollutant and its sources, are we likely to be particularly concerned about costs and
burdens to industry, individuals, or government?
1.)  Are the sources of the pollutant reasonably similar or do they vary considerably from
      source to source even within industrial categories?
2.)  Are there large differences in control costs among sources?
3.)  Are there either very many sources or very few?
4.)  Do we just not know very much about how to control the problem, the costs of control,
       or how to set environmental targets?
Given the pollutant and its sources, do we anticipate or hope that tomorrow’s understanding of
this problem or its solution will be significantly different than today’s?
1.)  Is our uncertainty about the nature of the risk relatively high?  Are the environmental goals
       very much in flux or are they likely to remain fixed for a reasonable period of time?
2.)  Is technology changing rapidly--either the technology to prevent or control pollution or
      within the industry or sector itself?
3.)  Can we achieve congressional environmental goals with today’s technology at an
       acceptable cost?
Not at all surprising, those tools without fixed targets are marked
with a caution.  One cannot say that goals will not be met—there are
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certainly instances when these instruments have been quite effective
in the past.  However, there is decreased certainty that environmental
goals will be met if tools without fixed targets are used alone.
If one prefers a fixed environmental target, the next question to
ask is, “Does this target need to be source-specific?”  Some environ-
mental problems are regional in nature—for example, urban ozone
and acid rain—and thus, can be successfully addressed by regulatory
programs that incorporate marketable emissions or another multi-
source tool.  For those problems that are local in nature, such as ex-
posures to some toxic air pollutants, many will judge multi-source in-
struments to be inappropriate.  Similarly, the more difficult it is to
monitor sources, the harder it is to use multi-source tools.
The desire to allow sources to retain as much autonomy as possi-
ble leads one to prefer instruments with no fixed target—those on the
second page of Table 3.  The desire for greater assurance pushes one
further towards instruments placing direct limits on pollution.  How-
ever, many other concerns complicate the decision.  Foremost among
these issues is, “Will costs and burdens to industry and government be
acceptable?”
Increased autonomy to sources often can improve the cost-
effectiveness and fairness of pollution prevention or control.  How-
ever, government burdens might increase along with source flexibility
if increased oversight appears necessary to keep the same level of as-
surance that goals will be met.  We highlight several questions that
help assess the overall costs and burdens in the context of a specific
pollution problem.  Some questions focus on the nature of targeted
sources, including question such as:  “Are there large differences in
control costs among sources?”  “Are there very many sources, or very
few?”  Other questions consider our knowledge basis by asking:  “Do
we know how to set environmental targets, how to control the problem,
or what it would cost to control?”
Government burdens are affected greatly by available knowledge
and the complexity of required analytical tasks.  For example, a po-
tentially risky pollutant that one might otherwise wish to control with
a harm-based standard may be so poorly understood that a different
choice might be necessary.  Identifying available methods of control
under a design standard poses fewer analytical difficulties than de-
termining acceptable pollutant concentrations under a harm-based
standard, though a design standard might require a less-than-ideal
level of pollution control.  Such tradeoffs are not theoretical; Con-
gress changed the harm-based approach to air toxics to a design stan-
FRIEDMAN_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 03/13/01  10:54 AM
Spring 2000] THE CHALLENGE OF COMPETING GOALS 385
dard in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments because the harm-based
approach had proven virtually impossible to implement.
Most of Richards’ Table 3 corresponds to the “costs and bur-
dens” section of our Table 3, except for the last rows that are legal
factors.  Richards quite usefully adds another cost consideration that
the OTA Report overlooked—the cost of public funds for those in-
struments, such as subsidies, with high cost to government
There is one more related concern that may alter one’s choice of
instrument:  given the pollutant and its sources, do we anticipate or
hope that tomorrow’s understanding of this problem or its solution will
be significantly different than today’s?
If the uncertainty about the nature of the risk is relatively high or
if technology is changing rapidly, one might be drawn to those in-
struments that are most adaptable to change.  Technical assistance
programs, information reporting, and liability usually push sources to
make changes without government approval and can be relatively
easily modified by government when the need arises.
If, for a particular problem, Congress’ environmental goals just
cannot be achieved with today’s technology at an acceptable cost, one
might choose those instruments that spur technology innovation.
Pollution charges can be effective because of the continuing pressure
they exert.  Product bans also spur innovation, but they are typically
avoided unless the risks from the pollutant are quite high.  Multi-
source instruments, such as tradeable emissions or challenge regula-
tions, offer sources additional flexibility for using new technologies
and thus may also help.  Richards’ Table 3 includes this criterion as a
production cost factor and highlights this as a concern when choosing
an instrument.127
VII.  USING MORE THAN ONE INSTRUMENT
As one can readily glean from our Table 3, or Richards’ Table 3,
it is indeed rare that one instrument alone will satisfy all of the desires
that policy-makers may have when attempting to solve an environ-
mental problem.  Thus, one finds historically a reliance on the use of
multiple instruments when addressing a problem.  The single most
common combination is the use of design standards in conjunction
with harm-based standards.  About half of the 30 major pollution con-
trol programs under the CAA, the CWA, and RCRA follow this ap-
127. See Richards, supra note 1, at 280.
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proach.  Control of conventional water pollutants, such as biological
oxygen demanding materials (BOD) and suspended solids, is typical
of this combination.  For water bodies that meet the desired level of
water quality set by each state, sources that discharge directly into
lakes and streams are required to control discharges to a level defined
by a design standard specific to each source category and pollutant.128
Municipal sewage treatment plants are required to control to a level
equivalent to “secondary treatment,” and industrial dischargers must
control equivalent to “best available technology economically achiev-
able.”
However, if the water body does not meet the desired level of
water quality, sources are subject to a harm-based standard; that is,
sources are required to clean up their effluent to a level that allows
the lake or stream to maintain the specified water quality.  The sim-
pler design standard becomes a “floor” or minimum level of control.
However, if the desired water quality is not achieved, the more ana-
lytically complex harm-based standard then applies.  This mix of in-
struments is a compromise allowing the relative speed, simplicity, and
lower administrative burden of design standards in cleaner areas and
the potential for more efficient controls using a harm-based approach
in areas where more stringent and expensive controls are needed.
Our Table 3 rates both design standards and harm-based stan-
dard about the same for cost-effectiveness and fairness of control, but
design standards have an edge when it comes to demands on govern-
ment.  The key difference is the ease of analysis.  For example, the
difficulty of setting harm-based standards was probably the primary
reason for the slow pace of regulating air toxic emissions since the
1970s, which led Congress to change strategy in the 1990 CAA
amendments.  As discussed earlier, Congress abandoned a strategy
based primarily on the use of harm-based standards and adopted an
approach that directs EPA to first issue a design standard (emissions
equivalent to those achieved by using “maximum achievable control
technology”) and then to analyze whether “residual-risk” goals are
exceeded, and if so, to require additional controls.  Thus, by using a
multi-source approach, Congress attempted to buttress the weak-
nesses of harm-based standards with the simpler approach of design
standards.
However, both the “single-source” design and harm-based stan-
dards are merely average with respect to efficiency and fairness of
128. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
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control, though harm-based standards are probably the better of the
two.  Hence, the reason for the great attention being given to multi-
source instruments, which have the potential for improved cost effec-
tiveness.  As can be seen in Table 3, we rate “multi-source” instru-
ments such as tradeable emissions and integrated permitting (which,
in our definition, includes facility-wide “bubbles” or emission caps) as
potentially more cost effective.  Several problems addressed by the
CAA currently combine tradeable emissions with more traditional
single source approaches.  To date, these have primarily been limited
to emissions of pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen ox-
ides—pollutants whose effects are regional as opposed to the more
localized impacts of toxic air pollutants.  For example, trading has
been extensively used to allow new sources to locate in nonattain-
ment areas—areas that do not meet ambient air quality standards.
New sources can locate in nonattainment areas if they “offset” their
emissions with reductions from existing sources.  Another area where
trading has been used is compliance with exhaust emission standards
for heavy-duty diesel engines.
The topic of instrument choice is important precisely because it is
so rare for one instrument alone to satisfy all of the desires that pol-
icy-makers may have when attempting to solve an environmental
problem.  Moreover, it is even difficult to choose a mix of instruments
that achieves high marks on all seven of the criteria considered in this
study.  As societal values and priorities change, and as new problems
emerge to challenge our existing taxonomies and frameworks, we
agree with Richards that, far from being an academic exercise, the
issue of instrument choice is in fact worth our collective efforts to
help move the nation’s environmental performance in the right direc-
tion.
